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THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF CRIME
ROBERT LEIDER*
Two visions of American criminal law have emerged. The first vision is
that criminal law is statutory and posits that legislatures, not courts, draft
substantive criminal law. The second vision, like the first, begins with
legislative supremacy, but it ends with democratic dysfunction. On this view,
while contemporary American criminal law is statutory in theory, in practice,
American legislatures badly draft and maintain criminal codes. This
effectively delegates the “real” drafting of criminal law to prosecutors, who
form the law through their charging decisions.
This Article offers a third vision: that modern American criminal law is
primarily conventional. That is, much of our criminal law is defined by
unwritten common-law-like norms that are widely acknowledged and
generally respected, and yet are not recognized as formal law enforceable in
courts. This Article makes three contributions. First, it argues that criminal
law conventions exist. Second, it explains how nonlegal checks on
prosecutorial power bring about criminal law conventions. Third, it provides
an account for how legislatures and courts should respond to a criminal law
heavily comprised of norms that rely primarily on nonlegal sanctions for
their enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Two visions of contemporary American criminal law have emerged.
The first vision, often recited by judges, is that criminal law has become
statutory. 1 Proponents of this opinion observe that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over common law criminal prosecutions,2 and that a
supermajority of states have abolished common law crimes. 3 Instead,
legislatures now decide which conduct is permissible and which is
prohibited. In theory, this is a good thing. Only by making criminal law
statutory can the criminal law comport with basic principles of legality. 4 The
people’s representatives decide what should be criminalized, and individuals
have notice that the government has prohibited certain conduct.
The second vision, more common in academic circles, contends that
modern criminal law has devolved into the “law” of prosecutorial discretion.
Adherents to this vision argue that contemporary legislatures badly draft and
maintain criminal codes. Legislatures enact too many laws. 5 Congress, in
particular, has created a federal criminal law that duplicates state criminal
codes. 6 State and federal laws are often too broad, criminalizing actions that
should be lawful. 7 Worse still, the statutes are often vague, making it difficult

1

Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(a) (3d ed. 2017); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law
Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 971–72, 972 nn.17 & 19 (2019) [hereinafter Hessick, Myth]
(collecting authority for the claim and ultimately arguing against it); Kevin C. McMunigal, A
Statutory Approach to Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1285, 1287 (2004) (“The dominant
attitude expressed in American jurisdictions is one of legislative supremacy and exclusivity.”);
John W. Poulos, The Judicial Process and Substantive Criminal Law: The Legacy of Roger
Traynor, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 429, 432 (1996) (“Statutes have always played a significant
role in American criminal law. Hence, we gradually developed a preference for statutory
criminal law.”).
2
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812). Perhaps erroneously, this case now
stands for the proposition that “[t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is
entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures
of statute.” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985). But Hudson did not rule out
Congress passing a statute conferring jurisdiction on federal courts over common law crimes.
3
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 980–83 (surveying states).
4
Id. at 971–98 (describing the conventional view).
5
See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 263
(2001); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 744–45 (1996).
6
See Stephen F. Smith, Federalization’s Folly, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 35 (2019)
[hereinafter Smith, Folly].
7
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 360 (2019); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506–07 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics].
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to tell what conduct is criminal. 8 If breadth and vagueness were not bad
enough, legislatures hesitate to repeal or amend crimes that have become
desuetudinal or are rarely enforced. 9 Combined, proponents argue that these
problems leave us with a criminal justice system that suffers from vast overcriminalization. In modern America, everyone commits “three felonies a
day.” 10
According to the adherents of this view, these legislative defects provide
prosecutors with plenary power over the administration of criminal justice. 11
Because modern criminal law is so broad, prosecutors are delegated the
power to decide who to charge and with which crimes.12 Even where a person
has clearly violated the law, prosecutors have absolute discretion to select
which crimes to charge, and that selection has an enormous impact on the
defendant’s ultimate sentence. 13 Conversely, defendants have little power.
Most constitutional rights designed to protect defendants against the
government are trial rights, and few people today go to trial. 14 Prosecutors
have too many crimes to prosecute, while most defendants are guilty of some
wrongdoing. 15 So, prosecutors offer defendants lower sentences in exchange
for guilty pleas. Defendants who refuse and go to trial face a massive trial
penalty if they are convicted. 16 Faced with offers they cannot refuse, 17

8

Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 360.
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L.
532, 533 (1970); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal
Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1333–34 (2008).
10
HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT
(2011).
11
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 579–80 (“Enforcement discretion permits
overcriminalization, which in turns encourages more discretion. The result is an unwritten
criminal ‘law’ that consists only of enforcers’ discretionary decisions.”).
12
Id. at 506, 509.
13
Griffin, supra note 5, at 273.
14
See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1071, 1073–74 (2017); Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
1071, 1074–75, 1080–81 (2019).
15
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1970); NEIL M. GORSUCH, JANE
NITZE & DAVID FEDER, A REPUBLIC IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 242–43 (2019); Carolyn B. Ramsey,
The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1309, 1332 (2002).
16
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 6 (2018); Josh Bowers,
Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1664 (2017) [hereinafter Bowers, Juries].
17
See Clark Neily, Jury Empowerment as an Antidote to Coercive Plea Bargaining, 31
FED. SENT’G REP. 284, 286–90 (2019).
9
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defendants almost always plead guilty. 18 Trials are for the reckless, the
mentally ill, and the innocent—and sometimes even the innocent plead guilty
because the risks are so high or because they wish to escape pretrial
detention. 19 Courts have held that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
a core executive power, almost entirely unreviewable by judges.20 In essence,
criminal law today is contract law between prosecutors and defendants, who
have vastly unequal bargaining power. 21 One author laments that “our current
system of judicial passivity, legislative delegation, and prosecutorial
supremacy” is worse than the common law system it replaced.22
American criminal law scholars do not universally subscribe to either
of these visions. Some have pushed back on the claims that criminal law is
purely statutory. 23 These scholars argue that the common law remains an
important part of our substantive criminal law and that vague statutes
function as delegations to judges to define the scope of criminal law. 24 Some
scholars have also pushed back on claims that prosecutors possess unfettered
discretion, arguing that various institutional constraints curb prosecutors’ de
facto power. 25 But these recent articles have not provided a comprehensive
account of how checks and balances turn statutory criminal law into a de
facto common law system.
This Article articulates that vision of substantive criminal law. I argue
that the structure of criminal law comprises not just statutory and formal
common law, but also “conventions.” Conventions are unwritten norms and
18
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who
Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2F1Qxn7
[https://perma.cc/6TE3-4H9H].
19
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59
(2011); John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent
Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 173 (2014); Jeffery Q. Smith &
Grant R. Macqueen, Trials Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does it Matter?,
101 JUDICATURE 27, 34 (2017).
20
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Griffin, supra note 5, at 275;
Rebecca Krauss, Prosecutorial Discretion, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal
Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 4–7 (2009); Misner, supra note
5, at 736. For those few areas in which courts will review acts of prosecutorial discretion, see
Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1365, 1370–72 (1987).
21
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1968 (1992).
22
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 971; see also Hessick & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 359.
23
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 968; Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996).
24
See, e.g., Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 978–79; Kahan, supra note 23, at 473–74.
25
Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019) [hereinafter
Bellin, Power of Prosecutors]; infra note 27.
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customs that are not “law” in the strict sense but nevertheless act as
obligatory rules. 26 Unlike formal common law, which is enforceable in
courts, conventions are binding only through indirect means, such as political
pressure. But even though conventions may not bind legal actors in a court
of law, conventions cannot be reduced to exercises of mere prosecutorial
discretion.
How did we end up with a conventional criminal law? This Article
argues that our current system is a product of checks and balances. Darryl
Brown and Daniel Richman have explained how some democratic separation
of powers checks work to constrain prosecutors’ discretion. 27 Even if
statutory criminal law is overbroad, legislatures curtail the scope of criminal
law through legislative reform, budgetary decisions, and oversight. 28 Courts
occasionally curtail the scope of broadly drafted statutes by employing the
rule of lenity or void for vagueness doctrines. And executive officials are
accountable to the electorate and incentivized not to enforce criminal statutes
when such enforcement would be unpopular with voters. 29 The checks they
identify constrain prosecutors’ discretion to prosecute conduct that society
views as blameless, and they form part of my account, too. In addition, I
argue that legislatures and judges have various soft-power tools to constrain
prosecutors and that juries—or at least the threat of jury trials—heavily cabin
which charges prosecutors bring. Prosecutors who violate these norms by
prosecuting blameless conduct will struggle to secure a conviction,
regardless of the defendant’s technical legal guilt. Further, checks and
balances constrain prosecutorial discretion by reducing prosecutors’ ability
to show excessive leniency. For example, prosecutors are accountable to
voters, and federal overcriminalization allows federal prosecutors to compete
with local prosecutors. These checks, along with others, reinforce the
pressure to maintain the proper scope of criminal law against prosecutors
inclined to decriminalize too much.
Finally, this Article explains how legislatures and courts should
accommodate the existence of criminal law conventions. The existence of
conventions poses a difficult challenge for legal actors because, although
26

See infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 256 (2007)
[hereinafter Brown, Democracy]; Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between
Federal and Local Law Enforcement, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000 81, 91–96 (2000)
[hereinafter Richman, Changing Boundaries].
28
Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 256; Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law,
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789–93
(1999) [hereinafter Richman, Federal Criminal Law].
29
Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 256–65; Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra
note 28, at 789–93.
27
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conventions are mandatory in some political sense, they are not formal law
recognized by the legal system. Yet, this does not mean that courts,
legislatures, and executive branch officials should ignore their existence. The
forces that produce criminal law conventions provide a necessary check on
prosecutorial discretion; their existence prevents criminal law from
devolving into the prosecutor’s private preferences about what should be
unlawful. Given this, all three branches of government have a responsibility
to facilitate the political, public, and private sanctions that are essential to
maintaining a conventional system. In fact, the need for formal legal actors
to support conventions is especially acute in criminal law, where occasional
deviations from public conventions are often not publicized widely and
prejudice unsympathetic or marginalized defendants.
This Article has four parts. In Part I, I argue against the two
contemporary visions of criminal law. The first is that criminal law is
statutory, while the second contends that, due to rampant
overcriminalization, it has devolved into prosecutorial discretion. I argue that
neither account is an accurate description of our current criminal law system.
The statutory model has well-known shortcomings: Legislatures pass broad,
vague, and overlapping laws, effectively delegating much of the criminal law
to prosecutors. In addition, much criminal law remains common law,
including the definitions of inchoate crimes, causation, and defenses. Even
when legislatures purport to define these aspects of the law, they leave
significant details to judges. But the prosecutorial discretion model does not
offer a much better explanation. We have strong reason to believe that
prosecutors are constrained actors. When we look at what prosecutors
actually do, they primarily prosecute core crimes, such as murder, rape,
robbery, theft, drug crimes, weapon violations, and driving under the
influence of alcohol. Substantial portions of criminal law have fallen into
total or partial disuse, including, for example, consensual sex offenses, minor
speeding, and draft registration evasion. It seems unlikely that prosecutors,
exercising their own independent judgment, have such widely convergent
preferences on which criminal laws to enforce. Instead, this narrowing of
substantive law reflects that prosecutors have many constraints on their
power, even if those constraints do not come from formal law.
Part II argues that contemporary criminal law is primarily conventional.
Section A defines what “conventions” are and gives an account of how those
conventions support the legitimacy of a statutory criminal justice system.
Section B then illustrates, through examples, that criminal law conventions
exist and that they form an important part of our criminal law system.
Part III explains how these unwritten conventions emerge. I look at the
role of legislatures, elections, jurors, judges, and largely redundant state and
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federal criminal justice systems. Checks and balances from these sources
diminish the scope of prosecutorial discretion by placing constant pressure
on prosecutors to shape their charging decisions around generally accepted
societal norms. Prosecutors have outer limits on their ability either to
criminalize conduct that society does not believe is wrong or decriminalize
conduct that society wants punished.
Part IV examines the doctrinal implications of having a criminal law
built on unwritten conventions. Our current system of unwritten criminal law
conventions does not solve all overcriminalization problems caused by
broad, vague, and redundant statutes. I examine three areas where our
conventions have fallen short: the ability of prosecutors to abuse a
conventional system through arbitrary charges, the lack of true conventions
in plea-bargained sentences, and the effect of statutory overcriminalization
on criminal procedure. I then look at how a conventional system should
address these shortcomings. Building on Adrian Vermeule’s work with
constitutional law conventions, I argue that judges should enforce criminal
law conventions only indirectly, meaning that judges should neither ignore
conventions nor enforce them as independent sources of legal obligations.
This has two implications. First, because a conventional system relies on
indirect enforcement of norms, judges should promote checks and balances
in the criminal justice system. Without enforcing any particular conventions,
judges can still help maintain a system that allows for conventions to develop.
Second, judges have limited power, which they should exercise to enforce
particular conventions through indirect means, such as applying the rule of
lenity when prosecutors improperly enforce statutes. This final section
applies this framework to some problematic areas identified in the first
section.
Finally, I end on a cautionary note about criminal law conventions. A
major problem with statutory overcriminalization is the weakening of
criminal procedure guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of an offense.
I am more skeptical that doctrinal changes will allow unwritten conventions
to develop to solve these procedural problems, but I offer some modest
suggestions.
I. BEYOND STATUTES AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
This Part argues against the two primary conceptions of contemporary
criminal law. The first is that criminal law is essentially statutory.
Legislatures define crimes and punishments, and judges simply carry out the
will of the legislature. The second is that, although criminal law ought to be
statutory, criminal law has devolved into a system in which prosecutors
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essentially write the criminal code through their exercises of prosecutorial
discretion. Neither account accurately describes our system. The legislative
supremacy model undervalues the role of formal common law and cannot
account for how prosecutors effectively narrow the scope of statutory
criminal law. The prosecutorial discretion model does a poor job explaining
substantial areas in which prosecutors’ discretion seems to converge across
jurisdictions. The de facto criminal law—the criminal law courts actually
enforce—appears to be something different from either statutory criminal
law or the private whims of thousands of prosecutors.
A. STATUTORY CRIMINAL LAW

On the surface, contemporary criminal law appears to be almost
exclusively statutory. Most criminal law is state law,30 and most states have
abolished common law crimes. 31 An action is criminal only if the state
legislature has drafted a statute making the conduct unlawful. Even where
common law crimes exist, their scope is often limited to misdemeanors
involving public morals. 32 Meanwhile, federal law does not recognize
common law crimes. 33 Except for treason, which is defined by the
Constitution, 34 “[t]he definition of the elements is entrusted to the
legislature.” 35
State and federal courts have bought into the legislative supremacy
model. They routinely assert that defining crimes is a legislative function, 36
sometimes with strong language that the power “resides wholly” with the

30
Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political
Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453 (2009) [hereinafter
Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization].
31
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 980–83.
32
Brenner M. Fissell, When Agencies Make Criminal Law, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 855,
884 (2020).
33
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
34
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
35
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985).
36
See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424; State v. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118, 123 (Ariz. 1990);
Curry v. State, 649 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ark. 1983); State v. Darden, 372 A.2d 99, 101 (Conn.
1976); Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1266 (Ind. 2015); State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d
1084, 1085 (La. 1980); State v. Divis, 589 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Neb. 1999); Lapinski v. State,
446 P.2d 645, 646 (Nev. 1968); State v. Allen, 423 P.2d 867, 868 (N.M. 1967); People v.
Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8–9 (N.Y. 1942); State v. Wadsworth, 991 P.2d 80, 86–87 (Wash.
2000).
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legislature 37 or that crimes “are solely creatures of statute.” 38 The vision of
essentially statutory criminal law has led courts to construe criminal laws
more broadly than they once did. Courts now view their role as simply to
carry out the legislative intent manifested by the (often broad) text of the
statute rather than to use the canons of construction to construe criminal
statutes narrowly. 39 If a statute is genuinely ambiguous, courts will apply the
rule of lenity to narrow it 40 but only after exhausting all tools of statutory
interpretation to discern legislative intent.41 Rightly or wrongly, “[t]he
dominant attitude expressed in American jurisdictions is one of legislative
supremacy and exclusivity.” 42
As Hessick, Kahan, and others have explained, this legislative
supremacy model is closer to fiction than reality.43 At least a dozen states
retain common law crimes in some form.44 In others, statutes directly
incorporate common law elements or simply codify common law
37

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424; see also Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624 (Cal.
1970) (“[A] fundamental principle of our tripartite form of government . . . [is that] the power
to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.”).
39
E.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (“The rule comes into
operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers. That is not the
function of the judiciary.”); State v. Goodwin, 82 N.E. 459, 460 (Ind. 1907) (“While the rule
of strict construction applies generally to the interpretation of criminal statutes, the excessively
strict construction that formerly prevailed has in recent years been so modified as to look
within the bounds of reason and common sense to the legislative intent when plainly
manifested, or expressed, in the enactment.”); People v. Burchell, 100 N.E.3d 660, 665 (Ill.
App. 2018) (explaining that “the rule of lenity has limits and does not allow a court to construe
a penal statute so rigidly as to defeat the intent of the legislature”) (internal quotation marks
and ellipses omitted); see Shon Hopwood, Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon,
95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 918, 920–21 (2020) (arguing that the modern rule of lenity has been
narrowed since the 1970s); David S. Romantz, Reconstructing the Rule of Lenity, 40 CARDOZO
L. REV. 523, 543 (2018) (discussing the narrowing of lenity in federal cases); Sarah Newland,
Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 197, 202 (1994) (describing tension between legislatures and courts over strict
construction of criminal statutes). Courts, however, will apply lenity against overbroad
statutes that punish innocent conduct. Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420,
2431 (2006).
40
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
41
E.g., United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994).
42
McMunigal, supra note 1, at 1287; see also Kahan, supra note 23, at 470 (“The
conventional account treats substantive [federal] criminal law as exclusively legislative in
origin . . . .”).
43
See, e.g., Hessick, Myth, supra note 1; Kahan, supra note 23; infra notes 55 & 61 and
accompanying text.
44
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 980–83.
38
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terminology and concepts. 45 For example, North Carolina punishes
“[r]obbery as defined at common law,” 46 and Virginia, though it statutorily
splits murder into degrees, leaves the actual definition of murder to the
common law. 47
In many cases where the legislature drafts statutory crimes, the results
are “exceedingly open-textured statutes” that leave the true definitions to the
courts. 48 The federal government has numerous statutes prohibiting fraud, 49
among the most important of which are prohibitions against mail and wire
fraud. 50 But what is “any scheme or artifice to defraud?” 51 The statute does
not define this key term. So, the real work in defining this crime is done by
courts rather than by the statute’s text. 52 The same holds true for many other
crimes. Insider trading is a judicial specification of the Securities Exchange
Act’s prohibition against trading securities using “any manipulative or
deceptive device.” 53 And inchoate crimes, including attempts and
conspiracy, are more the product of judicial interpretation than their
legislative definitions. 54
Legislatures also may leave the general part of the law either undefined
or underdefined. For example, legislatures frequently do not
comprehensively define causation 55 or when individuals have affirmative
duties to act. 56 So even if a legislature defines murder as “intentionally or
knowingly killing another person,” that still does not tell us when a person
has “caused” the death or when a person may be held liable for a failure to
act. These details can make a great difference in criminal cases. Just look at
45
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.02[b], at 27–29 (8th ed. 2018);
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 987–88.
46
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-87.1 (2020).
47
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31–32 (West 2020) (defining different degrees of murder
but not defining what constitutes murder as opposed to other forms of criminal homicide).
48
Kahan, supra note 23, at 471.
49
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1040, 1341–1351 (2018).
50
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018).
51
18 U.S.C. § 1341.
52
Kahan, supra note 23, at 475; Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 988–89.
53
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 983–84 (providing and
explaining the prohibition as an example).
54
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 985–86; Kahan, supra note 23, at 472, 475–76, 479.
55
Eric A. Johnson, Dynamic Incorporation of the General Part: Criminal Law’s Missing
(Hyper)Link, 48 U.C.D. L. REV. 1831, 1839 (2015); see, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 571
U.S. 204, 210–11 (2014) (adopting a “but for” causation requirement to a Controlled
Substances Act provision that applied when death “results from” a distribution violation);
United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting a similarity for a hate crime
statute applying to conduct that occurred “because of” the victim’s religious beliefs).
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Johnson, supra note 55, at 1839–41.
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Scot Peterson, the Broward County sheriff’s deputy who failed to intervene
in the Parkland High School shooting and now faces multiple counts of child
neglect causing great bodily harm. 57
In some jurisdictions, the common law still furnishes defenses. 58
Federal criminal law, for example, recognizes self-defense, defense of others,
duress, and necessity, even though no federal statute provides for them.59
Because the substantive scope of criminal law prohibitions is a function of
both the elements of a crime and the defenses that one may have, the scope
of criminal prohibitions is left partially to the common law. 60
Thus, criminal law heavily remains nonstatutory. The common law
often supplies definitions for crimes, even those that are statutory. The
common law also defines the general parts of criminal law (e.g., causation).
And many criminal law defenses are common law, not statutory. As Kevin
McMunigal concludes, “[T]he distribution of power in regard to criminal
lawmaking is considerably more complex and nuanced than the notion of
legislative supremacy indicates and . . . all three branches of government
exercise power in shaping criminal law.” 61
B. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW AS THE “LAW” OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION

Many academics offer a different vision from the legislative supremacy
model. These commentators argue that the true power to define criminal law
rests in prosecutors’ hands. 62 Legislatures pass broad, vague, and redundant
57

Audra D.S. Burch & Alan Blinder, Parkland Officer Who Stayed Outside During
Shooting Faces Criminal Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/06/04/us/parkland-scot-peterson.html [https://perma.cc/R2VT-Z4YL].
58
Johnson, supra note 55, at 1842; Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman
Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
40 (2000) (listing several states that rely on the common law for essential defenses).
59
See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 19 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring) (“When
Congress began to enact federal criminal statutes, it presumptively intended for those offenses
to be subject to [common law] defense[s].”); Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the
Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1434 (2017)
(acknowledging that federal courts “have long exercised powers to create defenses (for
instance, self-defense)” not included in statutes); Stephen S. Schwartz, Comment, Is There a
Common Law Necessity Defense in Federal Criminal Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259, 1263
(2008) (acknowledging judicial recognition of the defense of necessity and duress without any
statutory recognition).
60
For example, by not codifying self-defense, individuals cannot learn what constitutes
an “unlawful” killing for the purposes of the federal murder statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
61
McMunigal, supra note 1, at 1293–94.
62
See, e.g., Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 509; Bellin, Power of
Prosecutors, supra note 25, at 173–74 (collecting statements on prosecutorial power).
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laws that effectively delegate defining crimes and the magnitude of sanctions
to prosecutors and courts—but mostly to prosecutors, who can select who to
prosecute and which charges to bring. But a prosecutorial supremacy model
also does not fit well with how criminal law operates. Prosecutors enforce
many areas of criminal law consistently, including prioritizing the
prosecution of core crimes and refusing to enforce crimes for conduct that
the community no longer condemns. These areas of convergence, across
thousands of prosecutors with different views, belie the claim that
prosecutors’ private preferences control.
1. Prosecutorial Supremacy and Criminal Law
The prosecutorial supremacy model begins by observing
overcriminalization in America. Overcriminalization, in part, is a complaint
about the sheer breadth of criminal codes. 63 If one peruses the statute books,
one can find many desuetudinal crimes and trivial offenses. States frequently
criminalize adultery and fornication. 64 A whole chapter of the federal
criminal code is dedicated to “Emblems, Insignia, and Names.” 65 One section
of the same code makes it a federal crime to use the Red Cross insignia
without authorization, while another infamous provision protects “Smokey
Bear.” 66 Scholars routinely complain about these and other seemingly trivial
offenses. 67 And this kind of overbreadth is bad, we are told, because those
who engage in “conduct that society no longer condemns” still run the risk
of punishment. 68
A second permutation of the overbreadth problem is that many
individual statutes cover too much conduct, including conduct that many do
not consider to be socially harmful. 69 Examples can range from petty offenses
to serious ones. When there is no traffic, few people drive 55 miles per hour

63

Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 512–19; Myers, supra note 9, at 1340.
Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 229.
65
18 U.S.C. ch. 33.
66
18 U.S.C. §§ 706, 711, 711a.
67
See, e.g., Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 229 & n.16 (recounting overbreadth
objection and giving these examples); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704–708 (2005); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 747, 760. But see Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533
(1997) (explaining that many such laws have legitimate moral reasons supporting the
criminalization of conduct they prohibit).
68
Myers, supra note 9, at 1340–41.
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Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 229 (describing objection).
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on a major highway, even though they face a possible citation for speeding. 70
March Madness pools fall within anti-gambling statutes. 71 And off-duty
police officers face up to five years in federal prison if they carry their service
weapons within 1,000 feet of a school—a radius that is hard to avoid in most
urban and suburban areas. 72
A third permutation of overbreadth is that legislatures enact criminal
statutes with inadequate mens rea requirements. 73 Unlike socially beneficial
conduct, here a person has committed a social wrong but arguably not in a
blameworthy way. Take, for example, the prosecution under the National
Firearms Act in Staples v. United States. 74 In Staples, the defendant
possessed a rifle that had been converted to fully automatic by substituting
its internal parts. 75 Although the defendant knowingly possessed the rifle, he
contended that he did not know that the firearm had been converted into a
statutory “machinegun.” 76 The National Firearms Act makes it a crime to
possess an unregistered machinegun but contains no mens rea requirement. 77
Without judicial narrowing of the statute (which ultimately occurred), the
statute would place those who thought they were engaged in lawful
conduct—possession of a semiautomatic firearm—at risk of criminal
conviction.
Legislatures exacerbate the overbreadth problems with vague statutes.78
Among oft-cited examples are statutes against loitering, federal fraud
statutes, laws against racketeering, and statutes containing qualitative
standards such as prohibiting taking “unreasonable risks.” 79 Commentators
have particularly condemned the application of federal fraud statutes. 80
Those critics observe that federal prosecutors use fraud statutes to prosecute
70

See, e.g., State v. Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 398 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (“In fact, studies
conducted on a stretch of I–95 between Baltimore and Delaware demonstrate that 93% of all
drivers were observed committing some type of traffic violation.”).
71
Marc Edelman, Are NCAA Tournament Bracket Pools Legal?, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2013,
12:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/03/21/are-online-ncaa-tournam
ent-pools-illegal/#7fdd30e71d62 [https://perma.cc/89YC-HM4F].
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18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25), 922(q).
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Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
537, 568–74 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Overcriminalization]; Luna, supra note 67, at 723.
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511 U.S. 600 (1994).
75
Id. at 603.
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26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871.
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See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1137
(2017) [hereinafter Hessick, Vagueness].
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Id. at 1140–41, 1146 n. 46.
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breaches of fiduciary duties that seem more appropriately handled in civil
courts. 81
Compounding the overbreadth and vagueness problems, legislatures
also draft redundant criminal codes. 82 Redundancy can be
“interjurisdictional” or “intrajurisdictional.”83 Intrajurisdictional redundancy
occurs when a criminal code has multiple, overlapping crimes. 84 A person
who commits armed robbery of a motor vehicle may have violated laws
against carjacking, armed robbery, grand theft, and illegal carrying or use of
a firearm. Interjurisdictional redundancy occurs when multiple levels of
government criminalize the same conduct. 85 The federal criminal code has
expanded to include many core state crimes, such as robbery, weapons
offenses, drug possession, and sex offenses. 86 In fact, other than immigration
violations, most federal prosecutions today involve gun and drug violations
that are almost always punishable under state law. 87
Finally, scholars object to the harshness of American criminal law. 88
Since the 1980s, Congress and many states have implemented harsh
mandatory minimum sentence schemes. 89 Low-level drug dealers frequently
face “years or decades in federal prison.” 90 And prosecutors, thanks to certain
statutory enhancements, have applied harsh mandatory minimums against
81

Luna, supra note 67, at 709; see, e.g., Kate Taylor, Amid Modest Sentences, Prosecutors
Bring New Charges in Admissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2020), https://www.nyt
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Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 518; Myers, supra note 9, at 1343–44;
Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 228.
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Id.
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18 U.S.C. §§ 2111–2119 (robbery and burglary); 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–930 (firearms); 21
U.S.C. § 844 (simple drug possession); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2260a (sex offenses).
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Stephen Smith, Overfederalization 5–6 (Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 1761, 2017) [hereinafter Smith, Overfederalization], https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3019480 [https://perma.cc/3KUH-BGZ4].
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See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (explaining that American criminal
justice is much harsher than its European equivalents).
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Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 643, 674 (1997); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32040, FEDERAL MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES, 7–8 (2013); Steven Nauman, Note, Brown v. Plata:
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recidivists who have stolen a slice of pizza, pilfered three golf clubs, or
possessed a single bullet after a felony conviction. 91
Scholars argue that these defects in statutory criminal law transfer
enormous power to prosecutors, who are “the criminal justice system’s real
lawmakers.” 92 Because police and prosecutors lack the resources to enforce
every overbroad criminal statute, executive officers must use their discretion
to determine which crimes to prosecute and against whom. 93 For example,
many state prosecutors enforce laws against marijuana possession, 94 while
others do not. 95 Federal prosecutors choose to enforce laws against gun
possession and sexual exploitation of minors but not laws against carjacking
or violence against women. 96 Police officers set the de facto speed limits on
our roads. 97 Statutory vagueness contributes to the delegation problem. 98
Because many statutes are “open-ended, vague, and unclear,” 99 the
legislature has effectively failed to define what conduct is criminal and what
is not. Prosecutors make these determinations in the first instance, and they
frequently use vague statutes to prosecute an ever-expanding list of bad
conduct that is not otherwise prohibited by law. 100
For those who believe in prosecutorial supremacy, checks and balances
are a mirage. “[T]he story of American criminal law,” Stuntz writes, “is a
91

Id. at 710 n.44, 711 n.46.
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 506; see also William J. Stuntz, SelfDefeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1892 (2000); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Federal
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Mostly Possession, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/01/22/four-in-ten-u-s-drug-arrests-in-2018-were-for-marijuana-offenses-mostlypossession/ [https://perma.cc/X9SK-H2YU]; see also Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra
note 7, at 593.
95
See, e.g., MARILYN J. MOSBY, OFFICE OF THE STATE’S ATTORNEY FOR BALTIMORE CITY,
REFORMING A BROKEN SYSTEM: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF MARIJUANA PROSECUTIONS IN
BALTIMORE CITY 13 (Jan. 2019), https://www.stattorney.org/images/MARIJUANA_WHITE
_PAPER_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE33-YMBR] (outlining the State’s Attorney for
Baltimore City’s decision to no longer prosecute marijuana possession offenses); Justin
Jouvenal & Rachel Weiner, New Pot Policy in 2 N. Va. Counties, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2020,
at B1.
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Smith, Folly, supra note 6, at 51.
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Hessick, Vagueness, supra note 78, at 1157 n.106; STUNTZ, supra note 19, at 5.
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Kahan, supra note 23, at 474; Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 988–89; Shon Hopwood,
Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 695, 701 (2017).
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story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom
benefits from more and broader crimes . . . .” 101 Legislators are responsive to
the electorate, and crime is a significant issue for voters.102 As a result,
legislatures help prosecutors get guilty pleas by increasing the maximum
possible sentence and by making new, broad crimes, which are easier for
prosecutors to prove. 103 Broadly-defined crimes and long sentences leave
defendants with few possible defenses; their only leverage is to forgo trial in
exchange for reduced sentences or charges. Legislatures also enact symbolic
legislation to show constituents that they are doing something about crime,
even if legislators do not expect prosecutors to enforce the law. 104 Thus,
criminal law “always expands,” 105 and we are told that “[t]here is nearuniversal consensus in the legal community that our criminal laws are a
mess.” 106
2. Objections to Prosecutorial Supremacy Accounts
For the reasons Darryl Brown has explained, this description of the
criminal law, though widely accepted, is both misleading and wrong. 107 It is
misleading because the expansion of criminal law is not inherently a sign of
overcriminalization. 108 Many times, bad people do bad acts but find some
loophole in the criminal law. 109 Also, new criminal law problems emerge as
society evolves (e.g., drunk driving and computer crimes). 110 Although this
results in the expansion of criminal law, this expansion is not normatively
problematic. Brown also argues that Stuntz’s description of criminal law is
wrong because legislatures decriminalize large areas of conduct. Legislatures
have substantially curbed moral and religious crimes, including laws against
adultery, fornication, and breaking the sabbath, to name a few. 111 When
criminal codes need significant updating, legislatures have also
decriminalized many crimes at once as part of major law reform
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recommended by independent commissions who study the code. 112 The
criminal law, in other words, does not “always expand.”
Moving from criminal codes to prosecutors, Jeffrey Bellin has argued
why prosecutors lack much of the absolute power often attributed to them to
“make” the criminal law. At the outset, Bellin explains, the claim that
prosecutors make criminal law is ambiguous about which official is
responsible. 113 Is it the head district or U.S. attorney, who may set office
policies but personally prosecute few cases? Or is it their assistants, who may
be responsible for the vast majority of charging decisions? Or is it police or
law enforcement, who generally initiate criminal process through their
investigations and arrests? There are 2,344 prosecutor offices that employ
“about 78,000 attorneys, investigators, victim advocates, and support
staff,” 114 and they run the political gamut from liberal cities to conservative
rural regions. One cannot assume that these actors share prosecutorial
preferences.
Even if we could pin down which prosecutor is the decisionmaker, there
is significant reason to doubt that that person actually has the unilateral power
to set criminal justice policy. As Bellin continues, a person may exercise
discretion in different kinds of ways; a person can use his discretion when
executing a plan that “achiev[es] a shared goal,” or a person can exercise
discretion to “mak[e] a group of people do what you want.” 115 Prosecutors
may have significant prosecutorial power in the “shared goal” sense—that is,
when they exercise their prosecutorial discretion in accordance with the
norms of the community and of other actors in the criminal justice system,
such as legislators and judges. 116 But prosecutors have difficulty exercising
their prosecutorial discretion to override the judgment of everyone else in the
community. 117
In fact, the conventional prosecutorial discretion account acknowledges
that prosecutors have significant limits on their discretion. Proponents of this
model recognize that the prosecution of violent felonies by local prosecutors
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is “as a practical matter, mandatory in every case” 118 because the public
demands that prosecutors vigorously pursue such charges. 119 So, claims that
“[t]he law-on-the-street—the law that determines who goes to prison and for
how long—is chiefly written by prosecutors, not by legislators or judges” do
not apply to significant portions of criminal law. 120
If prosecutors truly had plenary power to set the criminal law, their
power would likely result in extraordinarily heterogeneous criminal justice
policy. Yet, the data we have on convictions and imprisonment demonstrate
that law enforcement efforts are mostly targeted at a narrow range of core
criminal behavior widely condemned by society. Start with state felony
convictions. About 85% of state felony convictions are for violent crimes,
burglary, larceny, fraud, drug crimes, and weapon offenses. 121 The remaining
15% is a nonviolent category and includes receiving stolen property and
vandalism. 122 Looking at the federal system, nearly three-quarters of felony
convictions involve drug offenses, immigration crimes, and weapons
violations. 123 These crimes also constitute about two-thirds of all federal
convictions (federal misdemeanor prosecutions comprise less than 10% of
the federal criminal docket). 124 Add fraud to that list, and the percentage
increases to about 85% of all federal felony convictions and more than threequarters of all federal crimes. 125
As with convictions, imprisonment data also reflects consistency in
punishing core criminal wrongdoing. There are about 2.3 million
incarcerated people in the United States: 1.3 million in state prisons, about
630,000 in local jails, and 226,000 federal prisoners. 126 More than half the
people in state prisons are there for violent offenses, mostly murder,
118
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2002).
122
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manslaughter, sexual assault (including rape), robbery, and assault. 127 The
other half is split among property crimes, drug crimes, and public order
offenses (e.g., driving under the influence and weapons violations). 128
Federal prisoners, like their state counterparts, are overwhelmingly
imprisoned for a narrow range of crimes. Nearly two-thirds of federal
prisoners are imprisoned for drug offenses and weapons violations, and that
percentage increases to nearly three-quarters when sex offenses are
included. 129 The remaining 25% is overwhelming composed of prisoners
convicted of extortion, fraud, bribery, immigration offenses, property crimes
(e.g., burglary and larceny), robbery, and other core violent crimes
(homicide, aggravated assault, and kidnapping) with a federal nexus. 130
Federal criminal law, thus, seems to have a well-defined core around
immigration, drugs, guns, and fraud, belying that individual federal
prosecutors are setting federal criminal law.
If there is one area that lacks good data, it is state misdemeanor practice.
This is unfortunate. Unlike the federal criminal law docket, state-law
misdemeanor cases make up approximately three-quarters of all criminal
cases. 131 And in general, different jurisdictions treat misdemeanors more
disparately than they do felony cases. 132 In a survey of eight jurisdictions,
Megan Stevenson and Sandra Mayson have found that the “core” of
misdemeanor practice generally comprised “possession of marijuana, simple
assault (often domestic violence), petty larceny (often shoplifting)[,]
. . . DUI . . . disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, prostitution, vandalism,
trespass, public intoxication, underage drinking, and unlawful possession of
weapons, drug paraphernalia, or crime tools.” 133 Although norms may be
shifting on some conduct (e.g., whether possession of marijuana should
remain a crime), most of this list (for example, driving under the influence,
assault, vandalism, and larceny) involves wrongdoing that the community
consistently condemns.
In providing these statistics, I do not deny either that
overcriminalization is a problem or that prosecutors have tremendous
127
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discretion. We can debate, for example, the legitimacy of broad drug laws
and vague fraud statutes. Many criminal codes are also too harsh, carry too
long of prison sentences, and bear all of the collateral consequences that
come along with having too many technical felonies. Even if the community
thinks that drug dealing ought to be unlawful, that does not imply that it is
appropriate to imprison low-level street dealers for decades or life. And
prosecutors exercise enormous discretion in important pockets of the
criminal justice system. Through their charging and plea decisions, they can
exercise considerable power over punishing those who commit crimes. 134
Prosecutors, for example, are not required to pursue sentencing
enhancements. And, more broadly, police and prosecutors may investigate
crimes with different thoroughness. For example, having “stop and frisk” in
one neighborhood, but not another, will almost certainly turn up more illegal
weapons in the place where the stop and frisk policy is carried out—which,
in turn, will affect who gets incarcerated. But these elements of prosecutorial
discretion are a different kind of discretion from prosecutors having the
quasi-legislative power to set the criminal code. Prosecutors only have that
power at the margins. 135
Finally, the political economy explanation undergirding the plenary
prosecutor model has not aged well. Whatever may have been true during the
1980s and 1990s, current voters’ political preferences do not appear to be as
uniformly “tough on crime” as the plenary prosecutor approach suggests. The
plenary prosecutor model describes a dysfunctional cycle in which
legislators, with voter approval, expand crimes and make sentences harsher
to give prosecutors more power. 136 But overcriminalization has emerged as a
politically salient issue today, with political constituencies pushing back on
both the pervasiveness of criminal law and its harshness. The killing of
George Floyd has prompted calls to “defund the police,” leading many cities
to reevaluate the kinds of cases police departments handle. 137 About half the
states have decriminalized some forms of minor drug possession and use. 138
134
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Many urban areas have elected so-called progressive prosecutors who have
run against incumbents for arresting too many people for too many petty
crimes. 139 For prosecutors and politicians in many jurisdictions, being too
tough on crime has become politically toxic. 140 To reduce the harshness of
criminal law, Congress and several states have recently passed sentencing
reform, including curbing mandatory minimums. 141 And a number of
jurisdictions have abolished the death penalty either de jure or de facto. 142
Overall executions are low compared with the 1990s and concentrated in just
a few states. 143 The present trend favors less harsh criminal law, not more.
Thus, neither prevailing model of criminal law is a good fit for how our
system actually operates. Our criminal law is not exclusively statutory.
Unwritten law exists everywhere. Because of vague and overbroad laws,
there is also a schism between statutory criminal law and how that criminal
law is enforced. Yet, from this, we should not conclude that criminal law has
devolved into only a “law” of prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors are only
one part of the criminal justice system. Many other individuals—legislators,
judges, voters, jurors, among others—also exercise significant power over
the system, and they may have competing or different priorities from
prosecutors. The net result is that while prosecutors exercise significant
influence over criminal justice policy, they do not control it.
II. CRIMINAL LAW AS A CONVENTIONAL SYSTEM
In the next two Parts, I offer a different vision of American criminal
law, one that recognizes that American criminal law remains primarily
139

(2018).

Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecutors,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 750–51

140
Id. at 751; cf. Eugene Scott, Joe Biden’s Tough-on-Crime Past Could Haunt Him in
2020, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2019/01/23/joe-bidens-tough-on-crime-past-could-haunt-him/ [https://perma.cc/W5YB-ZG
MW] (explaining that Joe Biden’s prior support for severe criminal penalties would be a
political liability for him in the Democratic presidential primary).
141
First Step Act of 2018, § 401 Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (reducing
mandatory minimum sentences and preventing the stacking of offenses that triggers
mandatory minimum penalties); Nauman, supra note 89, at 870–72; see also Brown,
Democracy, supra note 27, at 267 n.214.
142
Twenty-one states, as well as the District of Colombia, have officially abolished the
death penalty. Four other states are currently operating under a gubernatorial moratoria. States
with & Without the Death Penalty - 2020, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo
.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state [https://perma.cc/9XWF-8WMK] (last visited Feb.
21, 2021).
143
AMBER WIDGERY, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE STATE OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 3 (July 30, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/thestate-of-capital-punishment.aspx [https://perma.cc/963H-PJE4].
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unwritten. This Part argues that contemporary criminal law is defined by
unwritten conventions that are widely acknowledged and respected but lack
the status of formal law. Section A defines what “conventions” are and the
justification for having them, and Section B offers evidence that they form a
substantial part of our criminal law system. Part III of this Article will then
explain the legal and nonlegal checks that cause these conventions to arise.
A. WHAT ARE CONVENTIONS? WHY HAVE THEM?

Let me begin with the definition of a legal “convention.” Following
A.V. Dicey, Joseph Jaconelli, Adrian Vermeule, and others, I posit that a
“convention” is a kind of rule that is (1) not statutory or written law; (2) not
unwritten law enforceable in court (i.e., not common law); but (3) is generally
accepted as binding on legal actors; and (4) is enforceable against legal actors
through indirect methods such as political pressure. 144
Conventions are something more than mere exercises of discretion,
even if that discretion is exercised in a regular way. 145 To constitute a legal
convention, an action not only has to be “regular,” it must also “rest[] on a
sense of normative obligation.” 146 Thus, criminal law conventions are not
merely the fortuitous results of various institutional arrangements. What
makes something a convention is that individuals accept the normative force
of the conventions’ directives. As Barber has stated, “[c]onventions are rules
and, like laws, they purport to provide reasons for action that pre-empt, to
use Raz’s term, consideration of the reasons on which they depend.” 147
Conventions have a complex relationship with formal law. Many
conventions operate interstitially. The U.S. Constitution does not direct how
electors would select the President, nor (before the Twenty-Second
144
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J. 283, 288 (2015)
[hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions in Court] (defining “conventions” as “(1) unwritten rules
of political behaviour that are (2) widely acknowledged and regularly followed from (3) a
sense of obligation—either (3A) a thin sense of obligation resting on a credible threat of
sanctions or (3B) a thick sense of obligation resting on internalised precepts of political
morality”); see also Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 1163, 1182 (2013) [hereinafter Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence] (giving
attributes of conventions); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 280–81 (8th ed. 1915); Joseph Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional
Convention, 19 LEGAL STUDS. 24, 35–39 (1999); Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code:
Constitutional Conventions in U.S. Constitutional Law, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481, 483 (2018);
Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1852 (2013).
145
Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, at 287–88.
146
Id.
147
N.W. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 83 (Martin Loughlin, John P. McCormick
& Neil Walker eds., 2010).
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Amendment) did it provide how often a President could be reelected. Yet,
conventions require that presidential electors vote for the candidate for whom
they have pledged and, before the adoption of the Twenty-Second
Amendment, limited the President to two terms. 148 Conventions may also
supersede formal law. For example, in Britain, “the Prime Minister has the
power to declare war, even though, legally, this power is held by the
Monarch.” 149
One of the critical distinctions between conventions and formal law,
however, is that conventions are not enforceable through ordinary legal
channels. In Britain, for a bill to become law, the bill ordinarily must pass
both Houses of Parliament and receive the royal assent. 150 And British
constitutional conventions require that the monarch consent to a bill that has
passed Parliament. 151 The Queen’s decision to veto a bill sua sponte might
provoke a constitutional crisis. 152 But in a British court, that bill would not
be law. Because conventions are not directly binding and enforceable within
the legal system, commentators debate the degree to which they constitute
“law.” 153 I will bracket that debate in this Article.154 But a convention’s lack
of status as formal law means that someone can say, without contradiction,
that a convention “places constitutional (but not legal) limits on the capacity
of” a legislature. 155
Given that conventions are not enforceable in court, one might be
tempted to ignore them when describing the legal system. Blackstone took

148
Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, at 286 (providing these and other
examples). The Supreme Court has recently upheld state laws that incorporate electoral
college conventions requiring electors to vote for their pledged candidates. Chiafalo v.
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2329 (2020).
149
BARBER, supra note 147, at 93.
150
Jeremy Waldron, Are Constitutional Norms Legal Norms?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697,
1702 (2006).
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1704 (“The Queen knows that she must not withhold her consent, and she knows
that if she did, her action would not be regarded just as surprising or unprecedented, but
condemned as wrong and unconstitutional. She treats it as a rule that she must follow.”).
153
Id. at 1697; Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, supra note 144, at 1182–
84.
154
Depending on whether conventions truly are “law,” the title of this article is either
literal or metaphorical.
155
BARBER, supra note 147, at 79 n.22 (“The Sewel convention places constitutional (but
not legal) limits on the capacity of the Westminster Parliament to legislate in areas devolved
to the Scottish Parliament . . . .”); see also Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144,
at 290 (explaining that “legal but unconstitutional” is “a seeming oxymoron to the Americantrained lawyer” but not to a Commonwealth lawyer) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that approach when describing the British constitution, 156 dedicating several
chapters to royal executive power but not discussing the prime minister or
the cabinet. 157 But as Dicey pointed out, Blackstone’s explanation of the
British government “ha[d] but one fault; the statements it contains are the
direct opposite of the truth.” 158 In reality, the British constitution by
convention vests de facto executive power in the cabinet and, especially, the
prime minister. 159 Thus, as Barber has concluded, “an understanding of these
non-legal rules is essential to a plausible account of the constitution.” 160
Criminal law, I will argue, has similar conventions. On paper,
Wisconsin makes adulterers felons, 161 federal law prohibits the possession of
marijuana, including for medicinal purposes, 162 and the speed limits on many
highways are fifty-five miles per hour. But this is not the de facto criminal
law system. The laws on adultery are in desuetude, federal law enforcement
targets drug trafficking but not mere possession of marijuana for personal
use, 163 and the speed limits enforced on our roads are about ten to fifteen
miles per hour more than the posted sign. 164 Real criminal law and statutory
criminal law have diverged, just like the real British constitution does not
resemble Blackstone’s purely legalistic framework.
With respect to the scope of criminal law conventions, I do not suggest
that those conventions exist exclusively at either the national or local level.
Unwritten English law recognized both “general customs”—that is, “the
common law, properly so called” 165—and “[p]articular customs” which were
unwritten laws that “affect[ed] only the inhabitants of particular districts.” 166
In our federal system, criminal law conventions probably have a similar
structure. Many conventions are national in scope. One easy example is the
decriminalization of consensual sex offenses. 167 Even prosecutors in remote
and religiously conservative areas do not prosecute adultery and
156

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *190–337.
BARBER, supra note 147, at 81–82 (providing this example).
158
DICEY, supra note 144, at cxxx.
159
Rodney Brazier, A British Republic, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 351, 357 (2002).
160
BARBER, supra note 147, at 81–82.
161
WIS. STAT. § 944.16 (2020).
162
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2010).
163
Sadie Gurman, Sessions: U.S. Prosecutors Won’t Take on Small-Time Pot Cases,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/5b27da207202466f90a08ae87614e
aea/Sessions:-US-prosecutors-won’t-take-on-small-time-pot-cases [https://perma.cc/3TXU-3
K6E].
164
See infra notes 214–234 and accompanying text.
165
BLACKSTONE, supra note 156, at *63.
166
Id. at *67.
167
Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 235.
157
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fornication. 168 And the contrary examples sometimes cited are bizarre and
fleeting incidents. 169 Local customs exist, too. For example, rural areas may
ignore violations of a state’s concealed weapons law, while urban areas may
prosecute those crimes more vigorously. 170 The recent debate over “Second
Amendment sanctuary cities” may be seen as an effort to create local
customary law that effectively nullifies state statutory law within the
jurisdiction. 171 And even though our national drug norms may be in flux,
many cities have developed local customs that tolerate some personal use of
recreational drugs—San Francisco may be the most extreme example. 172
Of the many justifications for having conventions, a principal purpose
is that conventions correct for defects in the formal legal system. In the
British constitutional system, one obvious defect is legitimacy. What gives a
hereditary monarch the right to wield executive power? The conventional
cabinet system largely abates this democratic deficit by vesting de facto
executive power in a government accountable to the voters.173 Conventional
criminal law serves a similar legitimacy function to constitutional
conventions. Although I will not lay out a full theory of criminal law, for
present purposes, I will assume that what makes an act punishable is, in part,

168

See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ADULTERY: INFIDELITY AND THE LAW 61–67 (2016)
(explaining that adultery statutes “are generally unenforced” even when prosecutors have
evidence of a violation).
169
Id.; Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 258–59.
170
See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
FIREARMS, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 2 (Nov. 1995)
[hereinafter WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS], https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/woofccj.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9J8X-7KWL].
171
See, e.g., Letter from Mark R. Herring, Virginia Attorney General, to Hon. Jerrauld C.
Jones, Member, Virginia House of Delegates (Dec. 20, 2019), https://oag.state.va.us/files
/Opinions/2019/19-059-Jones-issued.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYN3-MQ8X] (opining on the
legality of Virginia’s sanctuary cities). For a limited defense of sanctuary cities, see Shawn E.
Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2020). My argument in this
Article would provide a qualified defense of sanctuary cities when prosecutors refuse to
enforce statutory laws that do not accord with legal conventions. But see infra note 174
(explaining when legal conventions may be unworthy of respect).
172
See Lee Ohanian, Why Drug Addicts Outnumber High School Students in San
Francisco, HOOVER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/why-drug-addictsoutnumber-high-school-students-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/AR4M-DN2X].
173
See Brazier, supra note 159, at 357 (noting that power has shifted from the Crown to
democratic institutions). But see id. at 383 (explaining that substantial portions of the royal
prerogative exercised by ministers lack effective democratic oversight).
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that the action breaches societal norms. 174 Criminal law conventions help
shape statutory criminal law around evolving norms.
If the goal is to have a criminal law with democratic legitimacy, one
might think that only a democratically elected legislature should determine
the proper scope of criminalization. Many commentators hold such views.
Some argue that legislative approval is more democratic than having
common law crimes. 175 Others go so far as to argue that legislative approval
is a necessary element of the principle of legality 176 or required by political
theories of punishment. 177 For example, relying on an expressivist theory of
punishment, Brenner Fissell asserts that “the symbolic communication of
condemnation must come from the community and that therefore the duties
imposed by criminal law must be determined by a democratic institution.” 178
But democratic legitimacy does not inherently follow from legislative
action. The existence of majoritarian approval is neither necessary nor
sufficient to make statutory law. Legislators are imperfect agents of their
constituents’ views. Legislators get captured by special interests, or they vote
based on the views of an impassioned minority over more apathetic
majority. 179 In either case, one cannot necessarily infer democratic
legitimacy from legislative approval.

174
Joel Feinberg, for example, argues that what separates criminal punishment from other
types of penalties is the expression of society condemning the act subject to punishment. Joel
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965). Joshua Kleinfield
uses the metaphor that “crime is a tearing of social fabric, and punishment is a restitching of
that torn social fabric.” Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1500 (2016); cf. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. Rev. 1655, 1678
(2010) (“A criminal is normatively innocent where his conduct is undeserving of communal
condemnation, even if it is contrary to law.”) [hereinafter Bowers, Equitable Decision]. Again,
this comes with the qualification that I am not attempting to articulate a theory of just criminal
law. I do not contend that societal condemnation is sufficient to warrant the imposition of
criminal punishment, nor that societal acceptance is sufficient to justify the lawfulness of
conduct. Correlatively, I accept that some criminal law conventions exist because society
recognizes them, and yet believe that they are unworthy of respect because they are
incompatible with general principles of justice.
175
Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 976 & n.40.
176
Id. at 976 (collecting examples of such theories).
177
Fissell, supra note 32, at 900–06.
178
Id. at 891; see also Myers, supra note 9, at 1341 (raising concerns that desuetudinal
and unconstitutional statutes will muddle criminal law’s expressive message).
179
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 132–68 (1965) (discussing
special interests); Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 69 (2006).

434

LEIDER

[Vol. 111

Majoritarian support, moreover, is insufficient to pass legislation.
Legislation faces many nonmajoritarian vetogates. 180 Presidents and
governors can veto bills that enjoy majority support. The federal Senate is
malapportioned. Heads of legislative committees enjoy disproportionate
influence over legislative business. Legislative time is limited; many state
legislatures are part-time, with heavily compressed schedules. As a result,
many laws with majoritarian support do not get passed, and contemporary
statutes lacking such support do not get repealed. 181
In some cases, the inability for simple majorities to get preferred
criminal law legislation through the legislature may be a positive thing. One
can distinguish, as James Madison did in the Federalist Papers, between a
majoritarian faction and “the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.” 182 If, as Fissell argues, “the symbolic communication of
condemnation must come from the community,” 183 perhaps we want the
condemnation to come from the community broadly rather than from a mere
majority. This has the advantage of defaulting to favor liberty over the
coercive effects of criminal law. And I will argue below that, because of the
ability of impassioned minorities to disrupt criminal law norms, conventional
criminal law is more consensus-driven than majoritarian.
For statutory criminal law, however, the inability of the majority to
repeal or amend criminal law legislation leads to an objection analogous to
the dead hand objection in constitutional law: from a democratic perspective,
why should we care if a legislature passed a crime unless a recent legislature
did so? 184 Legislatures passed many crimes decades or centuries ago. 185
Some of these old laws are in desuetude. But many are not, and some
jurisdictions enforce them vigorously. Congress passed the Controlled
Substances Act in 1971, 186 the Gun Control Act in 1968, 187 the law against
presidential assassinations in 1965, 188 and the Espionage Act in 1917. 189 How
does legislative approval decades or a century ago confer legitimacy today?
180
For a discussion of vetogates, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 70–80 (2d ed. 2006).
181
See, e.g., Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 249, 261; Myers, supra note 9, at 1345–
46.
182
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
183
Fissell, supra note 32, at 891 (emphasis added).
184
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 367 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting); Myers,
supra note 9, at 1332–34.
185
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1799).
186
Controlled Substances Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
187
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
188
Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-141, 79 Stat. 580.
189
Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217.
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The existence of criminal law conventions provides an answer to this
problem. We have developed an unwritten common law of crime by using
various political and legal checks to constrain prosecutorial decision-making
around contemporary community norms. Thus, we recognize certain criminal
statutes as legitimately constituting our modern criminal law because the
community presently recognizes the actions these statutes prohibit as
wrong. 190 In part, the true justification for a criminal law is not the existence
of a statute, but the community’s present belief that those who commit the
acts described in the statute deserve public censure and punishment. 191
This justification provides a better answer than other alternatives.
Perhaps one could argue that Congress has implicitly blessed old statutes by
not repealing them or by recently amending the statutes, thereby accepting
their legitimacy sub silentio. But this, again, ignores how difficult it is to
legislate in our system; nonmajoritarian vetogates prevent new laws from
passing, and they prevent us from repealing old laws. As a result, many
statutes exist that the majority does not support, but which lack sufficient
legislative support to repeal. Contemporary conventions provide a better
justification than legislative inaction.
The existence of conventions also explains why broad and vague laws
are less of a problem in practice than in theory. At first glance, our broad and
vague criminal statutes may seem like a delegation to prosecutors to develop
criminal law through their charging decisions. But that power has been
checked in a variety of ways by legislatures, the public, judges, jurors, and
other prosecutors. Because of these checks, prosecutors must continually
mold their enforcement of criminal law around contemporary public norms,
resulting in a more responsive de facto criminal law than could be achieved
through a legislative code, through judicial specification alone, or through
agency rulemaking. 192 And the existence of diverse checks by different
constituencies makes it more difficult for minority special interests to exert
their will than if criminal justice policy were set just by the legislature or by
a single prosecutor. If a legislature (captured by a special interest) enacts
criminal laws distasteful to the community, prosecutors will have a difficult
time enforcing them.
190

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1119, 1120 (discussing why the dead-hand argument is not a valid objection to textualism).
191
I say “in part” here because I do not want to be construed as condoning a morally
relative criminal law. See supra note 174. Although beyond this Article, I believe that a
morally justified criminal law must also be justified by a theory of justice that is external to
the community’s preferences.
192
Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,
19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1971) (“[P]ublic attitudes change over time, and it is not always
possible immediately to adapt the statutory law to these changes.”).
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Some may object that the lack of official promulgation means that
ordinary citizens cannot know or understand our criminal law. Myers, for
example, hypothesizes a person trying to determine whether fornication is
unlawful. He reads the statute books and finds a law, though someone assures
him that such laws are not enforced. 193 From this, Myers concludes that it is
“fundamentally unfair” to make someone “choose for herself, at her peril,
which of the laws on the books to obey . . . .” 194
Although I do not have the space here for a full-fledged defense of
unwritten law, I think this objection is mistaken. As Stephen Sachs explains
in Finding Law, people can have knowledge of unwritten and
nonpromulgated community customs. 195 People learn the de facto criminal
law through observation as part of the shared culture—the same way that
they learn about most societal customs. A newly-arrived Martian coming to
live in the United States may be genuinely confused about whether
fornication is a “real” crime, but no one who has lived in the United States
would harbor any doubt about the answer to that question.
That people generally learn criminal law conventions through
socialization is also evident when officials arrest individuals for violating
local norms. Although no American jurisdiction enforces laws against
fornication, jurisdictions vary widely in how they restrict gun possession.
Restrictive jurisdictions arrest many individuals who carry weapons that are
lawful in their states of residence but unlicensed in the jurisdiction. 196 These
individuals have no idea about the local laws and customs. 197 And
prosecutors in these jurisdictions often consider the lack of knowledge to be
a significant mitigating factor, allowing individuals to plead guilty to lesserincluded offenses. 198
Of course, the evolution of criminal law conventions is not a complete
answer to criminal law’s legitimacy. As Vermeule notes, “[c]onventions are
equilibria,” and sometimes society settles on equilibria that are “normatively
abhorrent.” 199 Paradigmatic examples include the customs of not prosecuting

193

Myers, supra note 9, at 1341–42.
Id. at 1342.
195
Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 538–39 (2019).
196
See, e.g., Michael Wilson, Legal Guns en Route to New York Are Cause for Arrest
Before Flight Home, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/
nyregion/lawful-handguns-departing-for-new-york-but-unlawful-upon-arrival.html
[https://perma.cc/5KGR-D6T4].
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, at 304–05.
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whites who killed African Americans in the South200 and white juries treating
African Americans more harshly than white citizens for comparable
crimes. 201 Another was the underenforcement of domestic violence crimes. 202
The existence of criminal law conventions does not insulate criminal law
from societal defects generally. Quite to the contrary, societal defects may
entail defects in criminal law conventions by hampering the indirect
enforcement of criminal law norms. A disenfranchised population cannot
vote out prosecutors, seek legislative changes, pressure city councils to
change how the police enforce the law, or serve on juries to prevent either
unjust acquittals or unjust convictions. I do not mean to suggest that our
conventional system is perfect. But it is better and more legitimate than a
purely statutory system, particularly because modern statutory systems take
place under nonideal conditions of limited legislative time and incentives to
placate special interests.
B. SOME EVIDENCE THAT CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS EXIST

My argument in this Section is that criminal law conventions exist.
These conventions form a crucial and largely overlooked part of substantive
criminal law, even if they do not constitute “law” in the most technical sense
of that term. The conventions have a common-law-like nature: they are
public norms that are widely acknowledged and respected by the public and
those charged with enforcing and administering criminal law. As with the
common law, conventional criminal law evolves as new norms emerge, gain
acceptance, and are recognized.203 Unlike the common law, however, these
customs are not directly enforceable in court or through other legal channels
but rely instead on political, public, and private sanctions for their effect. 204
These conventions shape much of de facto substantive criminal law and, thus,
narrow the effective range of prosecutorial discretion.
Let me start with perhaps the easiest example of criminal law
conventions: desuetudinal laws. Although definitions of legal desuetude
vary, a crime in “desuetude” generally refers to a statutory crime that “has
200
See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 174, at 407; Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 82–84 (2009).
201
W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i
d=3542575 [https://perma.cc/P432-SNDA].
202
Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 854–57
(1994).
203
Sachs, supra note 195, at 548–52.
204
Vermeule, Conventions in Court, supra note 144, at 286–88.
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not been enforced for a long period of time, no longer reflects the goals and
values of the community, and is thus widely ignored.” 205 Today, these crimes
often include morality offenses such as adultery, fornication, and unlawful
cohabitation. 206
Desuetudinal crimes have posed a significant challenge to our concepts
of legality. On the one hand, there is widespread recognition that such laws
are not a de facto part of our criminal justice system.207 Evidence that a law
has fallen into desuetude involves “a combination of open violations of the
law and conscious decisions not to prosecute.” 208 Yet, except in West
Virginia, courts have refused to invalidate such laws, so they remain part of
the statutory criminal law corpus. 209
Desuetudinal crimes fit the general criteria of criminal law conventions.
In most jurisdictions, no rule internal to the legal system—whether statutory
or common law—renders such laws unenforceable.210 Yet, the community
generally recognizes that the laws are not part of the de facto criminal law.
Prosecutors almost never bring such charges, let alone successfully convict
offenders. And this is not a matter of mere prosecutorial discretion. The
norms against prosecuting such cases are so well-engrained that prosecutors
bringing such charges would likely face insurmountable resistance both
politically and from other actors in the criminal justice system. 211 Thus, when
the New York governor publicly admitted committing adultery, he could

205

Mark Peter Henriques, Note, Desuetude and Declaratory Judgment: A New Challenge
to Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1069 (1990).
206
See Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 758–59 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
207
Arthur E. Bonfield, Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA L. REV.
389, 390–91 (1964); John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 531, 569–71 (2014) (giving traditional criteria for when a law had fallen into
desuetude).
208
Hillary Greene, Note, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal
Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 172 (1997).
209
Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209, 2211 (2006).
210
Robert Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1,
4 (1999) (“[T]he criminal law tradition in most American jurisdictions does not recognize a
doctrine of desuetude.”).
211
I, thus, disagree with statements suggesting that desuetudinal laws are merely a form
of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 9, at 1334. Such statements ignore the
binding nature of the norms, instead suggesting that prosecutors could choose to enforce such
laws.
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declare publicly (and without irony) that he “didn’t break the law,” 212 even
though adultery remains a misdemeanor in New York. 213
For a second example, take an area of great state overcriminalization:
traffic offenses. 214 It is virtually impossible to drive a motor vehicle without
committing a traffic offense. 215 Speeding is one of the most common
offenses. The general guidance on setting speed limits is that the limit
“should be the 85th percentile speed of free-flowing traffic, rounded up to
the nearest 10 km/h (5 mph) increment.” 216 But, as nearly everyone knows,
that does not happen. Speed limits are routinely set too low, 217 usually by
about ten to fifteen miles per hour. 218 Executive nonenforcement ultimately
compensates. In a study of 1.3 million speed tickets issued by Massachusetts
police from 2010 through part of 2016, fewer than 0.1% were for driving less
than five miles above the speed limit and 1.1% were for driving less than ten
miles per hour over. 219 A study of Ohio traffic tickets found that Ohio police
rarely ticketed drivers going less than ten miles per hour above the speed
limit. 220 And in Virginia courts, in 2018, the percentage of tickets for drivers
going less than five miles per hour above the speed limit was 0.007% and
212
Sewell Chan, Is Adultery a Crime in New York?, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM (Mar. 21,
2008, 1:51 PM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/is-adultery-a-crime-in-newyork/ [https://perma.cc/K8UX-5ZER].
213
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney).
214
See STUNTZ, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that speed limits often define the de facto
“minimum speed”). Brown notes that some states have decriminalized traffic offenses, but
even those states have statutes that, in theory, impose quasi-criminal civil penalties on
blameless conduct. Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 239–240, 269.
215
David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545 (1997); see also
id. at 558 (“Police officers in some jurisdictions have a rule of thumb: the average driver
cannot go three blocks without violating some traffic regulation.”).
216
KAY FITZPATRICK, PAUL CARLSON, MARCUS A. BREWER, MARK D. WOOLDRIDGE &
SHAW-PIN MIAOU, NAT’L COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM REPORT 504: DESIGN
SPEED, OPERATING SPEED, AND POSTED SPEED PRACTICES 51 (2003), http://onlinepubs.trb.
org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_rpt_504.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KXF-PN7F].
217
Id. at 48, fig.6 (noting the difference between eighty-fifth percentile speed and posted
speed limits); STUNTZ, supra note 19, at 3.
218
Fitzpatrick, Carlson, Brewer, Wooldridge & Miaou, supra note 216, at 52, fig.7.
219
Matt Rocheleau, Stay Less than 10 m.p.h. Above Speed Limit and You’re Unlikely to
Be Ticketed, BOS. GLOBE (July 28, 2017, 9:45 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/
2017/07/28/old-axiom-proves-true-stay-less-than-above-speed-limit-and-you-unlikelyticketed/HTU3lmnzuQ2hlaG1rvILFN/story.html [https://perma.cc/7KWW-F2QU].
220
Rodney Dunigan, How Fast Is Too Fast? The Most Common Speeding Ticket Triggers
in Ohio, ABC 6 NEWS (Nov. 21, 2017), https://abc6onyourside.com/investigators/how-fast-istoo-fast-the-most-common-speeding-ticket-triggers-in-ohio [https://perma.cc/U7J7-FCML]
(about 1,200 tickets out of 300,000 were written for doing less than eight miles per hour over
the limit).
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under ten miles per hour was 2.3%, whereas nearly 30% of cases involved
going 10 to 14 miles per hour. 221 Put somewhat differently, the true speed
limits on our roads are conventional rather than statutory. Motorists
believe—and enforcement statistics back up the belief—that the de facto
speed limit is about 10 to 15 miles per hour over the de jure limit.
The traffic offense example demonstrates how conventional law
modifies statutory law. The real norms for traffic speed are not found in
statutory law or regulations. They are not common law that one can enforce
in courts. 222 No individual or government body having authority has
promulgated them, and no court has recognized them. 223 Despite this, these
traffic customs are public, well-known, and respected as norms by both law
enforcers and citizens. 224 And these norms are enforced by indirect sanctions.
For example, when North Carolina police implemented its “obey the sign or
pay the fine” campaign, the mere rumor that police would strictly enforce
speed limits unsettled community expectations and became a newsworthy
event. 225 After police stated that they have the power to ticket motorists
exceeding the speed limit by any amount, 226 community concern prompted
officials to reassure the public that police still had discretion to ignore de
minimis speeding. 227 Political pressure prevented excessively strict
enforcement.
Although speeding is only a petty offense, the example highlights how
criminal law conventions correct for deficiencies in our statutory law.
Ideally, speed limits would reflect the true speed limit above which
221

Erica Mohun & Catalina Currier, The Need for Speed Proves Costly for Some VA
Drivers, INSIDE NOVA (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.insidenova.com/news/transportation/theneed-for-speed-proves-costly-for-some-va-drivers/article_2b49fd62-2290-11ea-b5b18b787dc056ab.html [https://perma.cc/AN5L-XKS8].
222
There might be more of a common-law claim in states with presumptive speed limits.
See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code § 22352 (West 2019); see also Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 534.352
(West 2019).
223
Sachs, supra note 195, at 534 (discussing how norms can arise in a decentralized
manner).
224
See, e.g., Rocheleau, supra note 219; see also Martin Austermuhle, Even D.C.’s Traffic
Cameras Tolerate a Little Speeding, DCIST (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:30 PM),
https://dcist.com/story/12/08/29/even-dcs-traffic-cameras-tolerate-a/ [https://perma.cc/A275TVNC]; Speeders Beware, Law Enforcement Is Cracking Down, ABC 11 NEWS (Mar. 22,
2016), https://abc11.com/travel/speeders-beware-law-enforcement-is-cracking-down/125720
9/ [https://perma.cc/VFN6-Q3D8].
225
Speeders Beware, Law Enforcement Is Cracking Down, supra note 224.
226
Id.
227
Tonya Maxwell, Ticket for 56 mph in a 55? Not Likely in NC, CITIZEN TIMES (Mar. 24,
2016, 4:49 PM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2016/03/24/ticket-56-mph55-not-likely-nc/82204916/ [https://perma.cc/C2ZP-6372].
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enforcement would begin. Then everyone would have notice of the actual
limit and the consequences for violating. As it stands now, the “true” speed
limit is an unknown limit, approximately ten to twenty miles per hour over
the de jure limit. But as imperfect as it may be, unwritten conventional norms
provide some corrective measure. Statutory speed limits are regarded as too
low. But individuals know with substantial certainty that they will not face
enforcement if they drive within about ten miles per hour of the speed limit
and with almost complete certainty if they stay within five.228 A driver’s
knowledge about the rules of the road come from custom, not from a statute
or a posted speed limit.
One may object that police enforcement patterns simply reflect how law
enforcement behaves in the face of resource constraints. With limited
budgets, 229 police and prosecutors prioritize some crimes over others. And
when everyone violates the speed limit, police lack the resources to enforce
speed limits against all motorists.
But this is an unpersuasive rationalization. Even where technology has
reduced resource constraints, 230 such as when cities use speed cameras, they
do not prosecute people for de minimis speeding. 231 In the District of
Columbia, tickets are generally issued only when the driver exceeds the
speed limit by ten miles per hour. 232 In Maryland, the legislature
(undoubtedly recognizing the conventional nature of speeding) imposed the
228
See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Arbitrary Law Enforcement Is Unreasonable: Whren’s
Failure to Hold Police Accountable for Traffic Enforcement Policies, 66 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1059, 1071 (2016) (concluding that police officers do not generally issue tickets for
minor speeding); see also supra notes 219–221 (showing that a small fraction of tickets are
issued at that speed).
229
Budgeting is a way that legislatures control enforcement. Brown, Democracy, supra
note 27, at 256; Richman & Stuntz, supra note 118, at 607.
230
Speed cameras do not eliminate all resource constraints since drivers could challenge
the ticket. But few do, given the cost and time involved. See, e.g., Kathy A. Bolten, TrafficCamera Appeals Often Successful, but Few Try, DES MOINES REG. (June 20, 2015, 9:13 PM),
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/06/20/automatedtraffic-enforcement-cameras-appeals/29055365/ [https://perma.cc/SJW8-F5XV] (compiling
statistics in Iowa).
231
See, e.g., Scott Calvert, Paul Overberg & Max Rust, Speed Cameras: The Cities with
the Worst Offenders, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
speed-cameras-the-cities-with-the-worst-offenders-11577010601
[https://perma.cc/28NE893N].
232
Austermuhle, supra note 224; Speeders Beware, Law Enforcement Is Cracking Down,
supra note 224; Luz Lazo, Drivers Continue to Ignore Speed Cameras in the District, Earning
City More than $100 Million, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.washingto
npost.com/transportation/2018/09/26/drivers-continue-ignore-speed-cameras-district-earning
-city-more-than-million/ [https://perma.cc/LT6R-EYZY] (noting about one-third of ticketed
drivers are doing eleven miles per hour over the limit).
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enforcement limit for speed cameras; Maryland’s law prohibits speed-camera
tickets for less than twelve miles per hour above the limit.233 In New York,
the City will issue tickets only for at least ten miles per hour over the limit. 234
So, the customs survive, even when few resource constraints exist; and where
legislatures are afraid that police will not respect the customs, they
incorporate them into statutory law.
For a third example, take the difference between federal and state
criminal law. Unwritten conventions of criminal law mediate the boundary
between these criminal law systems. On paper, federal criminal law
essentially duplicates state law, a fact that scholars widely criticize. 235 Yet,
as Klein and Grobey have explained, the “explosion in federal criminal law
. . . is largely irrelevant to charging decisions made by federal prosecutors.
Many of these new federal crimes are virtually ignored or overlooked by
prosecutors.” 236
Where is the boundary? The federal government often focuses on cases
that involve substantial interstate activity, are unusually complex, or involve
matters of national concern. 237 For example, the federal government
generally prosecutes international drug trafficking, while leaving drug
possession to the states. 238 The federal government prosecutes international

233
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-809(a)(8) (West 2020) (defining allowable “[s]peed
monitoring system[s]”); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-810(b)(3) (West 2009) (restricting a
work zone speed control system to recording images of drivers going at least twelve miles per
hour over the limit).
234
FAQ’s—Speed Cameras, VISION ZERO, https://www1.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/p
df/2014-10-speed-camera-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW3X-VSRW].
235
See, e.g., Smith, Overfederalization, supra note 87 (arguing that federal criminal law’s
duplication of state law is problematic, in part because of the severity of federal sentences).
236
Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 7 (2012).
237
Id. at 19.
238
Excluding marijuana possession offenses, the federal government prosecutes about
two hundred drug possession cases per year. MELISSA K. REIMER, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
WEIGHING THE CHARGES: SIMPLE POSSESSION OF DRUGS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 3–4, 5–6 (Sept. 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2016/201609_Simple-Possession.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4SR-4PXY]. The number rises to about five hundred per year if marijuana
offenses outside the District of Arizona are included. Id. at 4. In contrast, the government
prosecutes about twenty thousand drug trafficking cases per year. GLENN R. SCHMITT &
CASSANDRA SYCKES, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 5 (June
2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-public
ations/2019/FY18_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT75-94PG].
Drug trafficking is more complicated and often the result of cooperative agreements among
local and federal prosecutors. See Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 27, at 93–95.
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terrorism cases, even though these could be prosecuted under state law. 239
And the federal government often prosecutes interstate sex crimes. 240
In contrast, federal prosecutors rarely seek to prosecute core state
crimes, even when they have the legal authority. Statutes against domestic
violence, carjacking, gun free school zones, and motor vehicle theft sit
largely unused. 241 Undergirding this disuse are norms against federal
prosecutors usurping areas of traditional state concern, especially when state
law is adequate.
How has this boundary developed? Through usage and tradition.
Customary law develops when there is “a widespread practice, and . . . the
practice [is] followed from a sense of obligation.” 242 By custom, some crimes
become part of federal criminal law, while others do not.
For example, federal prosecutors routinely prosecute felons who
illegally possess firearms. 243 The Gun Control Act generally prohibits the
possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony if that firearm has
moved one time in interstate or foreign commerce. 244 Between fiscal years
2008 and 2017, federal prosecutors averaged about 9,100 prosecutions of
firearm offenses per year. 245 Of those, about 60% were cases in which felon
in possession was the lead charge. 246 To put that number in perspective,
239
Klein & Grobey, supra note 236, at 19 (reporting that the federal government
prosecuted all international terrorism cases in 2006).
240
Id. at 29–30.
241
See id. at 5–6; ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. DISTRICT CTS., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS tbl.D-2 (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-2/federaljudicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31 [https://perma.cc/M2GY-4PZH] (reporting about two
hundred fifty carjacking prosecutions per year and ten to fifty auto theft prosecutions); TRAC,
FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE FOR THIRD CONSECUTIVE YEAR (Nov. 29, 2017)
[hereinafter FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE], https://trac.syr.edu/tracrepo
rts/crim/492/ [https://perma.cc/UQ53-3RJ8] (reporting forty-seven prosecutions for the
federal Gun Free School Zones Act from 2008 through 2017 in which the violation of that Act
was the lead charge); TRAC, PROSECUTIONS FOR 2018 (Mar. 14, 2019), https://tracfed.syr.edu
/results/9x205c8aa4bef6.html [https://perma.cc/8N5U-SFJX] (noting that the federal
government prosecuted about one to eighteen cases per year where interstate domestic
violence was the lead charge).
242
Sachs, supra note 195, at 540.
243
See Phillip S. Jackson, Federal Firearms Prosecutions: A Primer, 33 U. BALT. L.F. 2,
2–3 (2002).
244
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1)).
245
EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST,. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 15 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/
usao/page/file/1081801/download/ [https://perma.cc/V9UV-ENB4]. The actual number is
9,129.5.
246
FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE, supra note 241.
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federal prosecutors averaged a little more than 60,000 federal prosecutions
per year during that same time period. 247 So, almost one in ten federal
prosecutions was primarily for a felon illegally possessing a gun.
In contrast, Congress prohibited traveling in interstate commerce for the
purpose of committing domestic violence. 248 The law passed in 1994 by solid
majorities in Congress—more than 55% in the House and more than 60% in
the Senate. 249 Yet, the federal government hardly prosecutes the law. During
the past twenty years, the federal government has filed between one and
eighteen cases per year where this was the lead charge. 250 More people are
prosecuted for going less than five miles per hour above the speed limit. 251
And this is not because domestic violence is rare or because the American
people do not support prosecuting people who harm their family members. 252
Likely, individual federal prosecutors do not feel empowered to routinely
federalize domestic violence cases even when they can satisfy the federal
jurisdictional nexus.
The boundary between federal and state criminal law is also heavily a
customary law. For many crimes, federal jurisdiction is easy to acquire—the
gun moved once in interstate commerce, a person used a telephone to commit
fraud, a robbery affects interstate commerce 253—so, the crime could be
prosecuted in state or federal court. Federal prosecutors cannot prosecute
everything within their jurisdiction, so they must narrow their focus. As
Richman recognizes, the border between federal and state criminal law is
both complex and evolving. 254 Underneath it are three key facts that help
247
EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORTS,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/annual-statistical-reports [https://perma.cc/F5W3-FT
N9] (compiling the United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Reports for fiscal years 2008–
2017).
248
18 U.S.C. § 2261.
249
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994).
250
See supra note 241.
251
See supra notes 219–221.
252
On the prevalence of intimate partner violence, see The National Intimate Partner
Sexual Violence Survey: 2015 Data Brief—Updated Release, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION 7–8 (Nov. 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-brief50
8.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V4N-8TFP] (estimating one in four women and one in ten men
experience domestic violence in their lifetimes).
253
See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (holding that a gun
has to move only once in interstate commerce for federal law to apply to gun possession); 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) (criminalizing wire fraud furthered by interstate telephone calls or
electronic communications); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (criminalizing the obstruction of interstate
commerce by committing robbery, extortion, or threats of violence).
254
See Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 27.
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demarcate the line, independent of any agreements between federal and local
prosecutors.
First, the border is heavily a law of sentencing. Regardless of the
theoretical maximum sentences, actual sentences imposed in the federal
system are often harsher than in the state system for comparable crimes,
partially because of stiff statutory mandatory minimums and the lack of
parole. 255 Prosecutors consequently decide whether to pursue federal charges
based on whether criminal defendants may deserve more punishment than is
available under the state system. 256 Although felon-in-possession cases make
up the bulk of federal gun prosecutions, the federal government still leaves
substantial numbers of these cases to the states. 257 Usually, the federal
government targets gun offenders who have more significant criminal
histories or who may be a danger to the community. 258
Conversely, when federal penalties are too harsh, federal prosecutors
leave prosecutions to the states. Take, for example, the prohibition against
carrying a concealed weapon aboard a commercial aircraft. Congress
originally made it a misdemeanor to carry a concealed weapon, unless the
person acted willfully or recklessly in “disregard for the safety of human
life,” which upgraded the offense to a felony. 259 In 1994, Congress increased
the penalty for mere possession to a felony punishable by up to ten years in
prison. 260 The new penalty was too harsh for a crime rooted in negligence.
The Transportation Security Administration found 4,432 firearms in 2019. 261
Most people who attempt to bring a gun through a security checkpoint
lawfully possess the weapon and simply forgot to remove the gun from their
bag, briefcase, or purse before going to the airport. 262 In response, the Justice
Department has issued guidelines narrowing the offense to “aggravated
255

Smith, Folly, supra note 6, at 40–41; Clymer, supra note 89, at 674.
Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 574–75 (2011).
257
See TRAC, FEDERAL WEAPONS ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 13, 2013), https://trac.syr.edu/trac
reports/crim/307/ [https://perma.cc/C2DU-KFS3].
258
See Daniel C. Richman, Project Exile and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 374–75 (2001) [hereinafter Richman, Project Exile].
259
Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466, 466–67 (1961).
260
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 705(b), 110
Stat. 1214, 1295 (1996).
261
Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., Number of Guns Brought to Airport Checkpoints
in 2019 Up 5 Percent (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2020/01/15/numberguns-brought-airport-checkpoints-2019-5-percent [https://perma.cc/Q8UU-JA5L] (also
providing data from 2009 until 2019).
262
Kim Bellware, TSA Caught People Trying to Fly with More Guns than Ever in 2019.
Experts Have Questions., WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
transportation/2020/01/20/tsa-gun-record-2019/ [https://perma.cc/ELQ4-9PSN].
256
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cases,” such as those who have a gun to commit a crime or those who
intentionally try to bring the gun on the plane. 263 The Justice Department
instructs prosecutors to refer other cases to state prosecutors or, if
appropriate, to use a federal misdemeanor provision. 264 And, as with many
of the previous examples, this is not just attributable to resource constraints:
quite the contrary, the federal government pursues civil penalties in nearly
all firearm cases involving airports. 265 Instead, federal prosecutors make a
conscious decision not to file felony federal prosecutions when the
application of federal criminal law would be excessively harsh in the
circumstances.
Second, federal criminal law is often used to defend peculiar federal
interests, including immigration crimes and fraud against the government. 266
About half of federal prosecutions comprise immigration offenses alone. 267
Third, cases are often brought under federal law when it would be
difficult for an individual state to investigate or prosecute because they lack
jurisdiction, resources, or technical knowledge. 268 These include complex
fraud prosecutions, computer crimes, international terrorism, and crimes that
transcend state jurisdictional boundaries. The federal government has
emphasized different kinds of crimes over time, and these changes often
relate to changes in community concerns, from alcohol and kidnapping
during the 1920s and 1930s to violent crime today. 269 The scope of federal
criminal law is heavily determined by public norms, even if prosecutors may
memorialize practice dictated by public convention in private agreements or
in statements of policy about what they will prosecute. 270
The malleable nature of conventional law—especially compared with
statutory law—aids in allowing substantive criminal law to evolve as
underlying assumptions change. Take, for example, the federal Gun Free
School Zones Act, which contains a clear prohibition against possessing a
263

U.S. Dep’t of Just., Manual § 9-63.161 (2020).
Id.
265
See Fredrick Kunkle & John D. Harden, TSA Goes for Guns and Money, WASH. POST
(Oct. 18, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/10/18/tsagoes-guns-money/ [https://perma.cc/6G7X-WEXH] (“The TSA filed more than 4,000 actions
against gun-carrying travelers in 2017 . . . .”). That number matches the approximate number
of firearms found in 2017. See Transp. Sec. Admin., supra note 261 (finding 3,957 firearms
at checkpoints). It is unclear why there were slightly more actions filed than firearms reported.
266
Klein & Grobey, supra note 236, at 6, 31.
267
TRAC, IMMIGRATION NOW 52 PERCENT OF ALL FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/446/ [https://perma.cc/WX4D-M8SC].
268
Klein & Grobey, supra note 236, at 9.
269
See Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 27, at 85–86, 90.
270
Id. at 93–95.
264
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firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, subject to narrow defenses that are also
clearly spelled out. 271 To carry a firearm in a school zone, law enforcement
officers must be on official duty, and private citizens generally need a license
to carry from the state in which the school zone is located.272 The precision
of the Act has caused it to become overbroad as subsequent developments in
state and federal gun laws have created policy conflicts. Federal law now
allows off-duty and retired law enforcement officers to carry their weapons
off-duty throughout the country, 273 most states allow adults to carry firearms
in some manner without a license, 274 and most states have some recognition
of out-of-state weapons permits. 275 If enforced to the maximum, the Act
would prohibit the public carrying of firearms in most urban and suburban
areas by these individuals. Yet, in the Act’s thirty years of existence, state
prosecutors have not referred such cases for federal prosecution, and federal
prosecutors have not made any effort to target these groups. What few
recorded decisions exist show that the Act has been primarily used as an
additional charge for those who commit other crimes in school zones. 276 This
is a significant narrowing of the statute.
Yet again, this narrowing does not simply reflect the exercise of
enforcement discretion. The question for whether something is a
“convention,” as opposed to an act of discretion, depends on whether the
relevant official has an obligation to respect the norm. The pertinent question
is whether, for example, a U.S. Attorney (or an Assistant U.S. Attorney)
could decide to prosecute police officers for carrying their service weapons
271

18 U.S.C § 922(q).
18 U.S.C § 922(q)(2)(B).
273
18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 926C.
274
Open Carry: Summary of State Law, GIFFORD’S L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/open-carry/
[https://perma.cc/XX9P-C7P6] (“Thirty-one states allow the open carrying of a handgun
without any license or permit, although in some cases the gun must be unloaded.”); Concealed
Carry: Summary of State Law, GIFFORD’S L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcent
er.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/ [https://perma.cc/Y68
Y-YWRZ] (“[Fifteen States] . . . generally allow individuals to carry concealed weapons in
public without a permit.”); Wikipedia.com, Constitutional Carry (accessed April 9, 2021, 8:50
PM)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_carry
[https://perma.cc/LP6J-KPNL]
(recognizing that approximately 20 states allow the carrying of concealed firearms without a
license).
275
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Maps for All U.S. States, GUNS TO CARRY (2019),
https://www.gunstocarry.com/ccw-reciprocity-map/
[https://perma.cc/9N5B-966V]
(acknowledging that thirty-eight states recognize at least some out-of-state weapons permits,
with twenty of those states recognizing all state-issued concealed carry permits).
276
See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez-Jorge, 894 F.3d 36, 36 (1st Cir. 2018); United
States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000).
272
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off duty. The answer is no—and obviously so. As Bellin notes, 277 a
prosecution requires the concurrence of other people—law enforcement
officers to make the arrest, a grand jury to indict, a petit jury to convict, and
support (or at least noninterference) from politically-accountable officers. A
U.S. Attorney who tried prosecuting such a case would likely come under
such intense scrutiny that he would be forced to drop the case. It is true that
in some formal sense a prosecutor may have the power to prosecute for a
technical violation. But that statement is like saying that the British monarch
could veto a bill against the wishes of Parliament and the government. What
is true in a formal legal sense may nevertheless be erroneous as a matter of
customary norms—norms that are enforced indirectly through the political
process rather than directly through the legal system.
As with formal common law, unwritten criminal law conventions
evolve over time. 278 To give an illustrative example, let me go back to felonin-possession offenses. The de facto expansion of federal criminal law into
weapons possession, a traditional state area, did not become a core part of
federal criminal law until at least the late 1970s and arguably the late 1980s.
The federal government statutorily began regulating the trafficking of
ordinary firearms in 1938 279 and first prohibited felons from receiving
firearms in interstate commerce in 1961. 280 But those statutes did not change
the substantive criminal law reality. Federal prosecution of gun crimes
remained uncommon until around 1990. 281 Federal weapons prosecutions
rose steeply during the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush presidencies,
trailed off for a bit during the early Clinton years, and then rose quickly
during the end of President Clinton’s second term and President George W.
Bush’s first term. 282
And similar to the evolution of formal common law, many conventions
evolve because someone violated an old convention. This was true with the
277

Bellin, Power of Prosecutors, supra note 25, at 181–82.
See Sachs, supra note 195, at 548–52.
279
Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938). Four years earlier, Congress
regulated the highly destructive weapons. National Firearms Act (NFA), ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236
(1934).
280
An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757
(1961). See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 695, 698 (2009).
281
Between 1966 and 1968, only two hundred seventy-eight arrests were made for Federal
Firearms Act violations. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control
Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 142 (1975); see also WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS,
supra note 170 (providing data from 1980 onward); FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE,
supra note 241(providing data from 1986 onward).
282
FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE, supra note 241, at tbl.1.
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federalization of state gun crimes, which was met with vociferous
complaints. In 1997, the federal government implemented “Project Exile” in
Richmond, Virginia, which diverted state weapons charges into federal
court. 283 At the time, Richmond’s murder rate was one of the country’s
highest. 284 One federal judge wrote a letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist
complaining that Project Exile had “transformed [the district court] into a
minor-grade police court.” 285 And without mentioning specific programs,
Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly complained about the federalization of
crime throughout the 1990s. 286 But repeated violation of one norm can create
a new norm, and in the case of guns, substantial federalization stuck. By
1999, stronger prosecution of federal gun laws had bipartisan support, the
support of the executive branch, and the support of state officials. 287 George
W. Bush made the expansion of federal prosecutions a part of his platform, 288
which he implemented when elected. 289 Today, felon-in-possession cases
compose a large fraction of the federal criminal docket. Sustained resistance
against an old convention can spark a new convention.
The federal policing of sex offenses also shows how shifts in popular
customs can alter the common law of crime—this time, in favor of
decriminalization. In 1910, Congress enacted the Mann Act, which
prohibited transporting in interstate or foreign commerce “any woman or girl
for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose.” 290 The Act “was aggressively used in the 1910s and 1920s to
combat prostitution and even fornication.” 291 But as American sexual mores
changed, prosecutions diminished. Beginning in the 1930s, prosecutors faced
jurors who harbored more liberal attitudes towards consensual sex; and as
convictions for consensual, noncommercial sex became more difficult to
obtain, prosecutors filed Mann Act charges based on that conduct less
283

Richman, Project Exile, supra note 258, at 370, 379.
Id. at 379.
285
Susan H. Moran, Report: Gun Crime Plan Is Unconstitutional, UNITED PRESS INT’L
(June 18, 2002, 5:37 PM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2002/06/18/Report-Gun-crimeplan-is-unconstitutional/42101024436279/?ur3=1 [https://perma.cc/FG3E-W5H9].
286
William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, 11 FED.
SENT’G REP. 134, 135-36 (1998); William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at Monday Afternoon
Session (May 11, 1998), 75 A.L.I. ANNUAL MEETING SPEECHES 13, 17–19 (1998); William H.
Rehnquist, The 1993 Year-End Report on the Judiciary, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 571, 574–75
(1994).
287
Richman, Project Exile, supra note 258, at 371–72.
288
Id. at 371.
289
See id. at 396.
290
Pub. L. 61-277, § 2, 36 Stat. 825, 825 (1910).
291
Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 257.
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frequently. 292 The Act “was nearly a dead letter by the 1960s.” 293 Since then,
federal prosecution of sex crimes has not ended, but shifted. Today, nearly
3% of the federal criminal docket comprises child pornography cases, 294 and
the federal government routinely prosecutes sex trafficking cases. 295 This
corresponds well to the shift in popular norms, which today recognize the
gravity of sexual abuse while accepting the legitimacy of consensual sex.
Mann Act prosecutions, thus, ultimately depended upon widely shared
cultural norms about the criminalization of sex. When societal norms
changed, prosecutors were bound to follow, and they faced indirect sanctions
(e.g., jury nullification) if they did not. Broad criminal statutes provided a
basis for federal criminal jurisdiction across a range of possible cases, but the
effective scope of those statutes depended on customary norms, which
changed over time.
Today, we continue to see evolution in criminal law conventions. The
possession of marijuana for personal use is becoming decriminalized. 296 The
federal government usually does not prosecute such cases, and increasingly,
state prosecutors do not either. 297 Serious hate crimes, in contrast, are being
shifted to federal prosecutors, who may seek harsher federal sentences
including the death penalty. 298 These trends follow broader social trends,
which show increasing sensitivity to bias-motivated wrongdoing and more
libertarian leanings on personal drug use. 299 How far the federal government
292

DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN
ACT 161–67 (John C. Fout ed., 1994). Overall Mann Act prosecutions and sentences
sometimes fluctuated higher, however, as prosecutors targeted organized prostitution. Id. at
168–69.
293
Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 257.
294
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 2016 2,
fig.2 (May 2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/rese
arch-publications/2017/FY16_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W
MR-4LEP].
295
MARK MOTIVANS & HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., NCJ 251390, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN-TRAFFICKING CASES, 2015 (June
2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fphtc15.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL7K-HWXV].
296
See supra notes 95 & 163.
297
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 294, at 3–5; supra note 95.
298
See, e.g., Devlin Barrett & Valerie Bauerlein, Alleged Charleston Church Shooter
Indicted on Federal Hate Crime Charges, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2015, 5:30 PM), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-plans-hate-crime-charges-in-charleston-churchshooting-1437587642 [https://perma.cc/7AES-GC8K]; Ann O’Neill, Tsarnaev Guilty of All
30 Counts in Boston Bombing, CNN (Apr. 8, 2015, 11:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2015/04/08/us/boston-marathon-bombing-trial/index.html [https://perma.cc/9RNS-R68C].
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will assume hate-crimes prosecutions or drug crimes will become
decriminalized remains to be seen.
Finally, much like formal common law, criminal law conventions are
not purely democratic. They need a broader social consensus than a weak
democratic majority to be binding and effective. For example, look at the
death penalty. Abolitionists are in the minority, even in some liberal states. 300
California voters have repeatedly voted to maintain the death penalty. In
1972, California voters overturned the state supreme court’s abolition of the
death penalty 301 with 67.5% of the vote. 302 Two recent propositions to
overturn the death penalty have failed by simple majorities. 303 Polls show
that Californians support the death penalty by a substantial majority. 304 And
jurors return death sentences, with more than 700 inmates awaiting
execution. 305 Yet, California has had only thirteen executions since capital
punishment’s reinstatement, and none since 2006. 306 The California governor

support-marijuana-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/94B4-N746] (tracking a consistent rise in
support of decriminalizing personal drug use); Sara Steen & Mark A. Cohen, Assessing the
Public’s Demand for Hate Crime Penalties, 21 JUST. Q. 91, 96–97 (2004) (tracking a
consistent rise in support of hate crimes prosecutions).
300
See, e.g., John Wagner & Peyton M. Craghill, Washington Post Poll Finds Most
Marylanders in Favor of Death Penalty, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.washingto
npost.com/local/md-politics/washington-post-poll-finds-most-marylanders-in-favor-of-deat
h-penalty/2013/02/26/c3f37fdc-800a-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_story.html [https://perma.cc/
Z4PW-LYS2] (60% in favor; 36% opposed); Connecticut Voters Say Abolishing Death
Penalty is a Bad Idea, QUINNIPIAC (April 25, 2012), https://poll.qu.edu/connecticut/releasedetail?releaseid=1739 [https://perma.cc/V9PF-DJAM] (62% in favor; 30 % opposed); infra
note 303.
301
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972) (holding the death penalty to be cruel
or unusual under the state constitution).
302
Cal. Proposition 17 (1972); Arthur L. Alarcó & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will
of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar
Death Penalty Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S132 (2011).
303
Cal. Proposition 62 (2016); Cal. Proposition 34 (2012).
304
See, e.g., Poll Finds Most Californians Support Death Penalty, ABC 7 (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://abc7.com/politics/poll-finds-most-californians-support-deathpenalty/5190628/ [https:/
/perma.cc/JX64-K63V] (60% in favor; 26% opposed); Phil Willon, Poll Finds Californians
Support the Death Penalty – and Newsom’s Moratorium on Executions, L.A. TIMES (June 17,
2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-death-penalty-poll20190617-story.html [https://perma.cc/H7GJ-8FNZ] (61% in favor; 39% opposed).
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Paige St. John & Maloy Moore, These Are the 737 Inmates on California’s Death Row,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-death-row/ [https://per
ma.cc/K622-GY8E].
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.cdcr.ca.gov/capital-punishment/number-of-executions-1893-to-present/ [https://perma.cc/N
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has recently called a moratorium. 307 Likewise, ten other states have not
executed anyone in more than a decade.308 And this despite majority support
for the death penalty. 309 Criminal law is difficult to enforce when society is
intensely divided.
In giving these examples, I do not purport to offer a comprehensive
account of what conventional criminal law actually is. That would be an
exercise in treatise writing. My goal here is only to show that criminal law
conventions exist—that is, that much of what comes within so-called
“prosecutorial discretion” results from obligatory customs that are indirectly
enforced. Modern substantive criminal law is heavily a law of unwritten
conventions, and these unwritten conventions function much like common
law. They are public norms that are widely understood, that evolve, and that
gain their legitimacy from general public consensus. These conventions
constrain actors in the criminal justice system, including prosecutors who, on
paper, may have near-absolute discretion to bring or decline charges.
Finally, the adaptation of statutory law into a de facto customary law
results in a different kind of common law than the modern view of the
common law. The post-legal realist vision of the common law, which Hessick
and Kahan seem to accept,310 is that judges promulgate the law through their
rulings. 311 But there is an older, more traditional vision of the common law,
which recognizes the law as a binding form of custom that society can
generally recognize even though no one has promulgated it. 312 Modern
substantive criminal law remains a heavily customary enterprise in this older
sense. To be sure, contemporary criminal law customs are not formally
legally binding in a court of law as the common law is. But they nevertheless
share many traits analogous to the pre-realist vision of the common law: the
existence of customs widely accepted by the public and by those in authority,
307
Sophia Bollag, ‘Ineffective, Irreversible and Immoral:’ Gavin Newsom Halts Death
Penalty for 737 Inmates, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 12, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.sacbee.co
m/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article227489844.html [https://perma.cc/CMJ2-4F
YA].
308
John Gramlich, California Is One of Eleven States that Have the Death Penalty but
Haven’t Used It in More than a Decade, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 14, 2019), http://www.pewr
esearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/14/11-states-that-have-the-death-penalty-havent-used-it-inmore-than-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/ZNS4-CRUF].
309
Death Penalty, GALLUP: IN DEPTH TOPICS, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/deathpenalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/8Z2F-AV6Y] (last visited July 21, 2020).
310
See Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 967 (“[J]udges played a central role in determining
the substance of criminal law . . . .”); Kahan, supra note 23, at 470 (describing common law
doctrines as “the products of judicial invention”).
311
Sachs, supra note 195, at 529 (describing this “modern” account).
312
See id. at 548–53.
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considered as binding as a matter of public morality, and defined without the
need for formal promulgation by a person acting with legislative or judicial
authority.
Thus, this Part has argued that criminal law consists heavily of
unwritten, conventional norms. Among other things, these norms demarcate
the line between criminal and noncriminal conduct, narrow the effective
scope of broad criminal crimes, and divide federal and state criminal
jurisdictions. And the conversion of statutory law into conventional law
provides continued legitimacy for criminal law statutes, as the connection
between the population and the legislatures who approved such laws weaken
over time. The next Part will explain how criminal law conventions develop.
III. REACHING EQUILIBRIUM: HOW DO CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS
DEVELOP?
On paper, prosecutors have enormous discretion. Yet, they lack the de
facto power to use much of that discretion to impose their personal criminal
justice preferences against greater societal norms. Why? Building on work
by Brown, Richman, Bellin, and others, I argue that prosecutors face
extensive checks and balances on how they exercise their power. Politically,
prosecutors are pressured by the legislature and the electorate, both of whom
demand that prosecutors punish core crimes but not overbroad crimes.
Within the court system, prosecutors face pressure from judges, who have
formal and informal tools to discourage prosecutors from being too harsh or
too lenient. Prosecutors also face political pressure from different levels of
government: overcriminalization and cooperative federalism combine to
make it difficult for prosecutors to punish too little or too much. For
prosecutors who try to criminalize too much, any individual prosecution is
ultimately answerable to a jury, who may be reluctant to convict those who
have not breached societal norms. Even though few cases go to trial today,
the mere threat of a jury cabins how prosecutors exercise their power. As a
result of all these checks, true substantive criminal law is largely determined
by societal conventions, not prosecutors’ private preferences. This section
will now explain how competing pressures from legislatures, elections,
jurors, judges, and federalism combine to cabin prosecutorial discretion and
create a common law of crime.
A. LEGISLATURES

As explained in Part II, legal conventions differ from formal law in that
conventions rely on indirect means for their enforcement. Instead of culling
the statute books, legislatures routinely use indirect means to curb broad
statutory law and to sanction executive officials who violate customary
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enforcement norms. One method is through budgetary decisions.
Legislatures can decriminalize conduct by cutting off funds to prosecutors
and enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution. 313 Or
legislatures can limit an enforcement agency’s budget, leaving it unable to
investigate and prosecute trivial offenses. 314
Legislatures also prevent excessive enforcement by directly or
indirectly controlling enforcement agencies. For example, legislatures can
restrict how enforcement agencies gather and use information needed for an
investigation, such as by prohibiting enforcement agencies from using
computer searches or by banning investigators from using wiretaps. 315 And
legislators conduct oversight of prosecutorial decisions. 316
Legislatures also use political sanctions against the executive to prevent
excessive enforcement. 317 For example, Congress blocked certain Justice
Department nominations to prevent what some Senators viewed as excessive
federal drug enforcement. 318 In 2009, President Obama’s Justice Department
responded to the increased legalization of medical marijuana in the states by
instructing the U.S. Attorneys in those jurisdictions not to prosecute
“individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.” 319 The
313

See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing effect
of a congressional appropriations rider prohibiting the Department of Justice from interfering
with states allowing medical marijuana).
314
See Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 257; see also LaFave, supra note 9, at 533–
35; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1542–43 (1981) (both similar).
315
See Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 28, at 800–02 (noting, for instance,
that “Congress has prevented ATF from creating a centralized computerized registry for
various firearms records”); see also Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal
Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
599, 636–40 (explaining why Congress restricted federal law enforcement’s ability to use
informants and wiretaps in public corruption cases).
316
See Griffin, supra note 5, at 280.
317
See, e.g., Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 28, at 789–90 (explaining how
Congress uses hearings and its power to confirm appointments to control executive discretion).
318
See Camila Domonoske, Colorado Sen. Cory Gardner Continues His Standoff with
Jeff Sessions over Marijuana, NPR (Jan. 10, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/t
hetwo-way/2018/01/10/577103864/colorado-sen-cory-gardner-continues-his-standoff-withjeff-sessions-over-marijua [https://perma.cc/WA59-WF3L]; Max Greenwood, GOP Senator
Says Sessions Broke Pledge to Him on Marijuana Policy, HILL (Jan. 4, 2018, 10:39 AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/367410-senator-says-sessions-broke-pledge-to-him-onmarijuana-policy [https://perma.cc/Q7W2-LWSS].
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Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected United States
Attorneys on Investigations & Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of
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Department of Justice expanded this guidance in 2013 to eschew
enforcement of marijuana possession in states that legalized it for
recreational use. 320 Five years later, Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded
the memo. 321 The revocation caused an immediate backlash from members
of Congress. Senator Cory Gardner, a Republican from Colorado—a state
that had legalized recreational marijuana—responded by blocking the
confirmation of about twenty D.O.J. nominees. 322 The standoff ended three
months later when the President assured Senator Gardner that the Department
of Justice would not interfere with Colorado’s legal marijuana industry and
that the Administration would support marijuana reform. 323 President
Trump’s next Attorney General, William Barr, pledged in writing to Senators
during his confirmation that he would abide by the terms of the 2013
memo. 324 Thus, legislatures can create de facto decriminalization by raising
the political price of enforcement beyond what the executive is willing to
pay. 325
When public prosecutors persist in overzealously enforcing statutes,
legislatures can respond by narrowing them. In 1968, Congress passed the
Gun Control Act, which, in part, made it a crime to knowingly engage in the

Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum-selected
-united-state-attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states [https://perma.cc/ZS2H-S2FH]
(on file with the Department of Justice archives); see also Memorandum from James M. Cole,
Deputy Att’y Gen., to United States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in
Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011) (updating
policy).
320
See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All United States
Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice
.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAF6-92KV] (on
file with the Department of Justice archives).
321
See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., to All United States
Attorneys, Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/27FV-CRR8] (on file with the Department
of Justice archives).
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See Domonoske, supra note 318; Greenwood, supra note 318.
323
See Seung Min Kim, Trump, Gardner Strike Deal on Legalized Marijuana, Ending
Standoff over Justice Nominees, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:17 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/trump-gardner-strike-deal-on-legalized-marijuana-ending-standoffover-justice-nominees/2018/04/13/2ac3b35a-3f3a-11e8-912d-16c9e9b37800_story.html
[https://perma.cc/P588-6KQN].
324
See Tom Angell, Trump Attorney General Pick Puts Marijuana Enforcement Pledge
in Writing, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomange
ll/2019/01/28/trump-attorney-general-pick-puts-marijuana-enforcement-pledge-in-writing/#3
8ab7f225435 [https://perma.cc/5PJ7-7EZE].
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business of dealing firearms without a federal firearms license. 326 During the
early 1980s, Congress held extensive hearings on the Act’s enforcement. 327
Many members concluded that, instead of targeting violent criminals, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had targeted legitimate gun
owners by prosecuting trivial technical violations. 328 Congress responded by
raising the mens rea to “willful[ness]” for most Gun Control Act violations
and narrowing the definition of those who are “engaged in the business” of
firearms. 329 Congress left the mens rea at “knowingly” for the felon-inpossession provision and for making a false statement to gun dealers. 330
Congress’s investigation and disapproval of the ATF’s enforcement
decisions sent the message that Congress disagreed with the ATF’s
enforcement priorities. The Bureau received the message. For the past twenty
years, the Bureau has primarily prosecuted people for unlawful possession of
a firearm. 331 There have been a few prosecutions each year for unlawful
dealing, but not many. 332 The ATF has been timid in its enforcement against
gun dealers who break the Gun Control Act—hesitant even to revoke their
licenses. 333
326
An Act to Amend title 18, United States Code, to Provide for Better Control of the
Interstate Traffic in Firearms, Pub L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
327
Legislation to Modify the 1968 Gun Control Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1987) (conducting hearings on Oct. 28,
1985, Oct. 30, 1985, Nov. 9, 1985, Feb. 19, 1986, & Feb. 27, 1986).
328
The Federal Firearms Owner Protection Act: Hearing on S. 914 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1 (Oct. 4, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); S. REP. NO. 98583, at 1 (1984) (Sen. Thurmond) (complaining that federal firearm laws had “given rise to
certain questionable enforcement policies”).
329
Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308 § 104(a)(1)(D) 100 Stat.
449 (1986); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21).
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Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308 § 104(a)(1)(A), (B) 100
Stat. 449 (1986).
331
See TRAC, WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS CONTINUE TO CLIMB IN 2018 tbl.2 (Aug. 27,
2018), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/525/ [https://perma.cc/KQ94-8NMX] (showing in
Table 2 that the number one charge for the past twenty years has been for unlawful acts—
including unlawful possession—with a firearm); FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE,
supra note 241 (about 5,000 prosecutions per year for violating the felon in possession law).
332
See FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS RISE, supra note 241 (about one hundred fifty
prosecutions per year nationwide).
333
See Ali Watkins, When Guns Are Sold Illegally, A.T.F. Is Lenient on Punishment, N.Y
TIMES (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/us/atf-gun-store-violations.html
[https://perma.cc/SS8Y-X74R]; Scott Glover, Unlicensed Dealers Provide a Flow of
Weapons to Those Who Shouldn’t Have Them, CNN Investigation Finds, CNN (Mar. 25, 2019,
8:39 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/25/us/unlicensed-gun-dealers-law-invs/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2HVV-EYZW]; see also Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 28,
796–98 (noting how legislative oversight and the ATF’s political weakness checks the
Bureau’s enforcement).
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This is just one of many examples where legislatures use their statutory
power to control excessive enforcement. Congress also maintains a
willfulness requirement in tax prosecution cases, even though it makes
federal prosecutions difficult against tax evaders who “genuinely,” but
unreasonably, believe that the federal income tax is unconstitutional or that
their wages do not constitute income. 334 In civil cases, Congress flipped the
burden of proof from the taxpayer to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
also made it easier for taxpayers to sue the IRS for damages. 335 State
legislatures restrict excessive enforcement, too. Pennsylvania prohibits its
local police from using radar guns to enforce speeding violations because the
legislature is afraid that municipalities will use excessive enforcement to
raise revenue. 336 Spurred by the arrest of a twelve-year-old girl for eating a
french fry in a metro station, the D.C. City Council reformed the city’s
juvenile delinquency law to allow police to cite juveniles instead of arresting
them. 337
Indeed, public prosecutors likely maintain their monopoly over criminal
prosecutions because we expect them not to prosecute trivial or blameless
cases. 338 In early America, private prosecutors brought most criminal
complaints. 339 One familiar quasi-criminal mode of prosecution was the qui
tam suit, in which a private informer split the penalty with the government.

334
See Klein & Grobey, supra note 236, at 70, 101; Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192,
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335
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https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-opi-pa-work-zone-cameras-radar-muschick-20181008story.html [https://perma.cc/V7WY-M39R].
337
See Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1150–51
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Martine Powers, Metro Transit Police Arrest Teenager for Carrying Chips
and Lollipop into Station, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/trafficandcommuting/metro-transit-police-arrest-teenager-for-carrying-chips-andlollipop-into-station/2016/10/19/1360a014-9627-11e6-bb29-bf2701dbe0a3_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4Q24-SD88].
338
See Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 258 n.168; see also Bowers, Equitable
Decision, supra note 174, at 1663; Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion,
Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PA. ST. L. REV. 1155, 1176 (2005) (arguing
in favor of publishing criteria for prosecutorial discretion). My thanks to Jeremy Rabkin for
suggesting this point.
339
See Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568,
571 (1984); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1205 & n.220
(1999).
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But private prosecutions produced undesirably high levels of enforcement, 340
and they have been largely abandoned.
Thus, it is not true that “when law enforcers are happier, so are
lawmakers.” 341 Even where legislatures confer broad authority on police and
prosecutors, they expect the executive branch to exercise its discretion
appropriately. And legislatures take either prophylactic or corrective action
when they do not trust the executive to abide by the norms. The threat of
these corrective actions helps maintain criminal law conventions.
Stuntz is correct that political factors incentivize legislatures to
proscribe too much conduct rather than too little, but this is not inherently a
bad thing. With respect to redundancy, overlapping criminal statutes with
different penalty provisions, gives prosecutors the ability to tailor
punishments to crimes, 342 including by showing mercy where warranted. 343
As for overbreadth, it is much easier for prosecutors to forgo prosecuting
some conduct than to try to stretch a statute unnaturally to cover other forms
of misconduct that society desires to be punished. 344 The use of broad and
vague statutes is not inherently problematic if sufficient checks curtail
prosecutors’ statutory power to punish nonblameworthy conduct.
Prosecutorial abuse does not occur solely by prosecuting too many
cases; prosecutors also can abuse their discretion by failing to adequately
enforce the law. 345 Although “[t]he prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a
case is virtually unreviewable,” 346 legislatures are sensitive to
underenforcement. If prosecutors are too lenient or lack resources,
legislatures can respond by decentralizing enforcement. Congress passed the
False Claims Act in 1863, 347 which authorized qui tam suits for treble
damages against those who defraud the government. Those provisions
340

See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 732 (2004).
341
Luna, supra note 67, at 722.
342
See Misner, supra note 5, at 742.
343
My thanks to Bruce Green for this point.
344
See Buell, supra note 109, at 1496.
345
Underenforcement of core crimes has been among the most pernicious police practices,
particularly hurting minorities and the poor. See Alexandria Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1723 (2006); see also LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES: THE
STORY OF THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
144 (1927) (recognizing that “if we turn to the state’s influence on liberty, we find that the
most extensive and frequent losses of liberty are not due either to court or executive, but to
the failure of the force of the government to protect men from violence and mobs”).
346
Misner, supra note 5, at 743.
347
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (original version at ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696,
698 (1863)).
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remain popular with key members of Congress, who guard the decentralized
authority against government prosecutors. 348 Decentralized enforcement
exists in the criminal context as well. State legislatures can authorize police
or victims to prosecute cases directly. 349 And legislatures can authorize
multiple government officers—say, the Attorney General and the local
prosecutor or multiple local prosecutors with overlapping jurisdiction—to
bring charges, thereby depriving a single prosecutor of a monopoly on the
authority to prosecute. 350 In addition to decentralizing enforcement,
legislatures can limit the ability of prosecutors to plea or charge bargain, if
they believe that prosecutors are abusing that power. 351
Recently, the Pennsylvania General Assembly decentralized
enforcement for gun crimes in Philadelphia. 352 As described more fully
below, Larry Krasner, the Philadelphia district attorney, has been under fire
for lenient plea bargains in cases involving violent crimes and gun crimes. 353
In response, the legislature gave the Pennsylvania Attorney General
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute unlawful gun possession and the
unlawful transfer of firearms arising in Philadelphia. 354 Prosecutors, thus, are
not mini-sovereigns, and even their ability to show leniency has limits.
B. ELECTIONS

Elections also serve to cabin prosecutorial power within a reasonable
range. 355 Most district attorneys and state attorneys general are elected. 356
348

For example, during his first stint in the Department of Justice, William Barr argued
that the qui tam provisions were “an abomination and a violation of the appointments
clause”—views that he maintained over a decade later. Interview by Jim Young, Nancy Baker
& Russell Riley with William P. Barr, in Charlottesville, Va. (Apr. 5, 2001),
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oralhistory-assistant-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/Z62E-KBZT]. But as a nominee for
Attorney General, Barr had to promise to “diligently enforce the False Claims Act” to win
confirmation. William Barr’s Hearing on Capitol Hill, CNN TRANSCRIPTS (Jan. 15, 2019),
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1901/15/cnr.04.html
[https://perma.cc/7KK4-6J9F
https://perma.cc/7KK4-6J9F].
349
Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1252 (2020).
350
See Misner, supra note 5, at 732–33.
351
Bellin, supra note 349, at 1251–52 (noting restrictions against bargaining away
consideration of recidivism).
352
See Act No. 58, H.B. 1614, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019).
353
See infra notes 365–73 and accompanying text.
354
See Act No. 58, H.B. 1614, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019).
355
See Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 258; Myers, supra note 9, at 1353.
356
See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1268
(2011); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
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These officers remain attuned to popular will because they want to continue
in their current positions or they have ambitions for higher office. 357
Prosecutors who are not elected—most notably U.S. Attorneys—are
generally politically sensitive for two reasons. First, they serve at the
discretion of an elected office holder.358 Second, many U.S. Attorneys have
ambitions for higher elected office or want to become judges, which requires
the support of elected officials. 359
For reasons well-explained, voters’ preferences make it difficult for
prosecutors to be too lenient. Many crimes—especially violent felonies—are
“politically mandatory” for prosecutors to pursue. 360 Notwithstanding
overcriminalization, 60% of state prisoners are imprisoned for one of the
traditional common law felonies, including murder, manslaughter, rape, or
robbery. 361 Voters’ preferences substantially reduce the amount of de facto
discretion prosecutors have when it comes to prosecuting serious mala in se
crimes.

U. PA. L. REV. 959, 983 (2009) [hereinafter Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus
Prosecutorial Accountability].
357
See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral
Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 349 (2002).
358
Fairfax, supra note 356, at 1268; see H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TITLED PLAYING
FIELD: IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? 45 (1999).
359
See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United
States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J.
271, 277 (2002).
360
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 118, at 2566–67 (2004); see also Bowers,
Equitable Decision, supra note 174, at 1658; Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 256;
Vorenberg, supra note 314, at 1526. “Politically mandatory” does not mean, however, that
prosecutors are obligated to dedicate all possible resources to identify the person who
committed the crime. Many crimes that are “politically mandatory” to prosecute may
nevertheless have low clearance rates. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, How Effective Are
Police? The Problem of Clearance Rates and Criminal Accountability, 72 ALA. L. REV. 47,
87 (2020).
361
STUNTZ, supra note 19, at 79; see, e.g., Chris Brennan, Philly DA Larry Krasner Casts
Carlos Vega as Part of Team Trump, PHILA. INQUIRER, (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://www.inquirer.com/politics/clout/larry-krasner-carlos-vega-trump-fop-20210326.html
[https://perma.cc/69FK-WRHB] (reporting that the Philadelphia police union endorsed the
progressive incumbent’s opponent); Bob Chiarito, Chicago Police Call for State’s Attorney to
Resign in Smollett Controversy, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-people-jussie-smollett-protests/chicago-police-call-for-states-attorney-to-resignin-smollett-controversy-idUSKCN1RD3CL [https://perma.cc/2PPY-6AXD] (reporting that
police called for the resignation of the State’s Attorney for dropping a prosecution involving
a false report to police).
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Lenient prosecution policies can also frustrate law enforcement officers,
who will take their frustration to the voters. 362 A prosecutor’s refusal to
prosecute can “expose police to media backlash and public outcry.”363 So,
police pressure prosecutors to file charges when they have made arrests. 364
Thus, after a spate of shootings, the Philadelphia Police Commissioner
indirectly suggested that Larry Krasner, the Philadelphia District Attorney,
had not been seeking adequate penalties when prosecuting gun violations. 365
Krasner disputed the allegation, 366 but the local press has begun tracking his
performance in gun cases. 367 Likewise, when Cook County State’s Attorney
Kimberly Foxx dropped charges against Jussie Smollett for falsely reporting
a hate crime, she received blistering criticism from the Mayor and the Police
Superintendent. 368 Ultimately, a special prosecutor reindicted Smollett about
a month before Foxx faced reelection. 369 A central issue in the election was

362

See Fairfax, supra note 365, at 1275 (explaining that police “are able to exert
institutional pressure on prosecutors who might otherwise be inclined to decline prosecution
in a given case”); Marco della Cava, More Progressive Prosecutors Are Angering Police, Who
Warn Approach Will Lead to Chaos, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2020, 11:50 AM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/02/08/criminal-justice-police-progressive-prosecutors
-battle-over-reform/4660796002/ [https://perma.cc/DQL6-NK46] (reporting the developing
tension between police and progressive prosecutors).
363
Bowers, Equitable Decision, supra note 174, at 1700.
364
Id. at 1700–01; see also Daniel C. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, in
PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 40, 46 (Máximo Langer & David
Alan Sklansky, eds. 2017) [hereinafter Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors] (“The police
who apprehend a suspect surely have views on whether and how much he should be
punished—views that prosecutors are bound to take into account.”).
365
Chris Palmer, Jeremy Roebuck, Dylan Purcell & Julie Shaw, Trading Blame for Rise
in City’s Gun Violence, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 23, 2019, at A1.
366
Chris Palmer, After Weekend Shootings, Philly DA Larry Krasner Defends His Office’s
Record of Gun Cases, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 18, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/larr
y-krasner-district-attorney-philadelphia-gun-prosecutions-richard-ross-20190618.html
[https://perma.cc/B7ZS-CX63].
367
See Julie Shaw, More Gun Cases Go to Court Diversion, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 23,
2019, at A17.
368
Hollie McKay, Chicago Cops Smell Political Rat in Wake of Jussie Smollett Case
Dismissal, FOX NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/us/chicago-cops-smellpolitical-rat-in-wake-of-jussie-smollett-case-dismissal [https://perma.cc/Q53A-K5C9]; Meg
Wagner, Brian Ries & Veronica Rocha, Jussie Smollett Charges Dropped, CNN (Mar. 28,
2019, 1:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/us/live-news/jussie-smollett-charges/h_6f33a329b128
da47c2e76aa745244e3a [https://perma.cc/H7PG-TKUG].
369
Courtney Gousman, New Smollett Indictment May Shape Cook County State’s
Attorney’s Race, WGN (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:50 AM), https://wgntv.com/2020/02/12/newsmollett-indictment-may-shape-cook-county-states-attorneys-race/ [https://perma.cc/8S5D-X
W42].
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whether Foxx properly handled the case in the first place. 370 Foxx won
reelection, but the incident caused political damage.371
Electoral pressure also helps discipline career prosecutors. Although
most prosecutors are career civil servants who are not directly accountable to
the voters, their bad decisions can create political headaches for their bosses.
For example, in Philadelphia, a prosecutor offered a three-to-ten-year plea
for an armed robber who shot a store owner with an AK-47. 372 Even though
the public elected Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner on a
progressive decriminalization platform, the deal went too far. After severe
negative publicity, Krasner unsuccessfully tried to revoke the deal and, going
forward, the office reaffirmed internal policies that require supervisor
approval of plea deals.373
Some have objected that prosecutorial elections do not accurately
measure prosecutorial performance. As Stephanos Bibas explains, many
prosecutorial elections are low-information, low-turnout events in which
anecdotes or misleading statistics may have outsized influence. 374 The public
may fail to notice isolated aberrations in prosecutorial decision-making. 375
Moreover, incumbency can prove an insurmountable advantage. 376 Election
results do not inherently reward good prosecutors and remove bad ones.
Still, the threat of elections provides some discipline for prosecutors. In
a low-information environment, prosecutors seek to avoid negative publicity,
which too much leniency easily produces. 377 Victims of serious crimes who

370

Id.
See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Despite Backlash over the Jussie Smollett Case, Kim Foxx
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Bobby Allyn, After Year One, Philly DA Larry Krasner Earns Praise from Reformers,
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Id.; Julie Shaw, Krasner Now Seeks to Vacate Plea Deal for AK-47 Gunman Who
Critically Wounded West Philly Beer Deli Owner, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/district-attorney-larry-krasner-seeks-reversal-plea-deal-akgunman-west-philly-20181208.html [https://perma.cc/GCR6-DYCF].
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at 983–87.
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do not get adequate justice will go to the press. 378 And too much tolerance
for minor crimes can erode quality of life. 379
Elections are not only an important check against excessive leniency;
they also help prevent overcriminalization. Prosecutors already lack
sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute all core crimes; many
murders and most rapes, robberies, burglaries, and car thefts go unsolved. 380
Given these limitations, if a prosecutor desired to prosecute adultery or an
office March Madness pool, it would likely create a public relations disaster.
Public pressure also can provide a modest check against arbitrary
enforcement, at least in high-profile cases. 381
Local elections are also susceptible to special interest capture, which
can reward the refusal to enforce laws that are deeply unpopular among a
passionate minority. Executive officials in many liberal cities have declared
themselves “sanctuary cities” in which they have refused to detain unlawfully
present aliens or provide assistance to federal agencies enforcing
immigration laws. 382 Not to be outdone, many conservative localities refuse
to enforce new gun-control laws. 383 Even if the gun-control laws are
supported by an electoral majority within the jurisdiction, sometimes elected
officials will gain more votes by going along with intensely held special378

Allyn, supra note 372.
See Rafael A. Mangual, The Bloody Toll from Baltimore and Chicago’s Soft-On-Crime
Mindset, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y RSCH. (Dec. 28, 2019), https://www.manhattaninstitute.org/the-bloody-toll-from-baltimore-chicagos-soft-on-crime-mindset
[https://perma.cc/FA88-ZUS9] (finding that declining to enforce low-level offenses and drug
laws leads to an increase in violent crime and community instability); Jake Novak, Opinion,
Big Cities Are Posing a Major Threat To The Economy by Ignoring Minor Crimes, CNBC
(Oct. 11, 2019, 1:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/11/big-cities-pose-major-threat-tothe-economy-by-ignoring-minor-crimes.html [https://perma.cc/WA2C-G5RS] (documenting
the negative economic effects for communities when quality of life crimes are not enforced).
380
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(providing clearance rates ranging from 13.7% for car theft to 61.6% of murders and
nonnegligent manslaughter).
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Bowers, Equitable Decision, supra note 174, at 1714.
382
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.cc/FE2S-RXHN] (last updated Oct. 26, 2020) (assembling a state-by-state list of sanctuary
localities).
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WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-second-amendmentsanctuary-movement-isnt-going-away-11579651251 [https://perma.cc/L5NQ-8JSU]; see,
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interest views than they will lose by acceding to weakly held majoritarian
beliefs. Elections help make criminal law conventions more consensus driven
than purely majoritarian.
Finally, the public’s preference for law-and-order politics may not be as
static as once assumed. In recent elections, progressive candidates have won
several local prosecutorial elections on promises to prosecute less. 384 Even
national presidential candidates have faced difficult questions about their
law-and-order records. 385 When crime rates are low and people feel safe, they
may be more sensitive to claims that the justice system is too harsh. Electoral
politics are now moderating criminal law. The fact that most local
prosecutors are elected arguably backs these decriminalization decisions with
democratic legitimacy. 386
Thus, electoral oversight helps cabin prosecutorial discretion. In a lowturnout, low-information election, the worst thing a prosecutor can do is stir
up passionate hatred among a significant constituency. Prosecutors are
incentivized to prosecute core crimes, but not waste resources on overbroad
application of criminal laws that lack public support.
C. JURORS

Juries act “as a lay buffer . . . ‘against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor.’” 387 Jurors, as community members unlearned in the law,
arguably have a comparative advantage in deciding whether someone ought
to be punished, notwithstanding the technicalities of the criminal law. 388
Jurors can check excessive prosecutions in different ways. Their most
extreme power is to nullify—that is, to refuse to convict despite a belief in
guilt. Jurors do this in at least two circumstances: first, when they believe the
underlying conduct is not blameworthy; and, second, when they are aware
that the penalties are too high relative to the blameworthiness of the

384
These elections have included races in Chicago, Denver, Houston, Philadelphia,
Orlando, and St. Louis. Andrew McCarthy, The Progressive Prosecutor Project, COMMENT.
MAG. (Mar. 2020), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-progressive-prosecut
or-project/ [https://perma.cc/7TAR-GNTX].
385
Jeffery Taylor, Harris Brings Experience, Law-and-Order Baggage to Biden Ticket,
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 12, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/harris-brings-experience-law-and-order-baggage-to-biden-ticket
[https://perma.cc/AQ47-F4KB].
386
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Bowers, Juries, supra note 16, at 1656 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968)).
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Id. at 1657.
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offense. 389 English juries, thus, refused to convict Protestant dissenters,
undervalued stolen loot in larceny cases, 390 and refused to condemn those
who violated a statute punishing the exportation of wool with death. 391 Even
today, prosecutors worry about jurors exercising their power to acquit.
Recently, for example, federal prosecutors received mandamus against a
district judge, who had ruled that the defendant could tell the jury that he
faced a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence if convicted of a statutory
sex offense. 392 Obviously, the prosecutor would not have been concerned—
and certainly not to the level of seeking a trial stay and mandamus—if he
thought that the jury would view the crime as sufficiently blameworthy to
merit a fifteen-year sentence. More broadly, the decision to seek mandamus
shows that prosecutors strongly oppose giving juries sentencing information.
But jurors need not resort to full nullification to affect criminal
prosecutions. Sympathetic jurors are also more likely to actually believe that
reasonable doubt exists. 393 And even jurors who favor harsh criminal
penalties in the abstract may hesitate to convict once faced with a particular
defendant. 394
Although jurors in theory form an important buffer between a defendant
and the state, in practice, the role of jurors has been greatly diminished
because jury trials have almost disappeared. 395 In recent years, only 2–3% of
federal defendants had their cases resolved by a jury trial. 396 State jury trials
are similarly rare. One study sampling sixteen jurisdictions found that juries
389

Lora M. Levett, Erin M. Danielsen, Margaret Bull Kovera & Brian L. Cutler, The
Psychology of Jury and Juror Decision Making, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVE 365, 388–89 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005).
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391
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See Michael Conklin, Reasonable Doubt Ratcheting: How Jurors Adjust the Standard
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395
See, e.g., Hessick, Myth, supra note 1, at 1016 (“The elimination of trials has also
removed juries as a check on substantive criminal law in individual cases.”).
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BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TABLE D-4—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS–
CRIMINAL FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statisti
cs/table/d-4/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31 [https://perma.cc/LT9Q-CZ29]
(2.17%) (last visited Jan. 23, 2021); BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TABLE D4.
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF, BY TYPE OF DISPOSITION AND
OFFENSE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2017 (2017), https://www.usco
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Y] (2.15%) (last visited Jan. 23, 2021); Offit, supra note 14, at 1074.
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resolved 1.1% of criminal cases in 2009. 397 A Bureau of Justice Statistics
sampling showed that 98% of felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas,
with only 2% coming from jury trials. 398 And in 2012, the Supreme Court
reported that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” 399 Moreover, the
function of juries in trials has been reduced to that of a factfinder applying
the law given by the judge; under the modern view, they are not supposed to
interpret the law on their own or act as judges of normative guilt. 400
Despite the rarity of jury trials, though, the mere possibility of
presenting a case to a jury has a significant constraining influence on
prosecutors. In a recent ethnographic study of federal prosecutors, assistant
U.S. Attorneys explained that their beliefs about how jurors would view cases
affected the investigation methods they employed, their decisions whether to
pursue charges or decline prosecution, and what plea offers they decided to
make. 401 Prosecutors made their decisions, among other things, on
perceptions of how the jury would view the defendant, the victims, the
witnesses, and the significance of the charges. 402 Prosecutors, for example,
described their dislike of bringing technical regulatory prosecutions for
crimes such as structuring, unless they could tie those crimes to broader
wrongdoing. 403 Those findings confirm what prosecutors say and do
elsewhere. A recent interview with a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives official explained that the Bureau has difficulty prosecuting
unlicensed gun sellers because many have no criminal records, which makes
jurors hesitant to convict. 404 Prosecution records confirm this preference.
Between Fiscal Years 2008–2017, U.S. Attorneys brought about 1,500
prosecutions where unlicensed gun dealing was the lead charge, 405 while they

397

Offit, supra note 14, at 1075 (citing VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS M. CLARKE,
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398
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399
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brought about 60,000 prosecutions against prohibited persons (e.g., felons)
for possessing firearms. 406
Thus, even in a world where nearly all cases are plea bargained, juries
(or the threat of jury trials) play a significant role in determining the scope of
modern substantive criminal law. For a plea bargain to happen, there must be
a mutual exchange. A defendant gives up his trial rights in exchange for a
lower sentence; the prosecutor, in turn, gains an easy conviction without the
cost of going to trial or needing to worry whether the evidence will be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. A prosecutor who pursues a case in which
the jury likely will not convict, regardless of the evidence, has little leverage
with which to bargain. Under these circumstances, jury pressures incentivize
prosecutors to pursue the kinds of wrongdoing which jurors will convict if
there is a trial. Even as prosecutors now operate “in the shadow of the
jury,” 407 the threat of jury trials contributes to developing an unwritten
conventional law of crime.
D. JUDGES

The judiciary also plays a critical role in developing criminal law
conventions. Law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges are all repeat players
in the criminal justice system. Actions taken by police and prosecutors that
exceed customary norms may invite pushback from the judiciary, even if
police and prosecutors’ actions are technically within the law.
Judges have a wide variety of tools to limit prosecutorial abuse. Judges
wield ultimate power over statutory interpretation, and they use it to cabin
the scope of vague and overbroad laws. 408 Judges, first, narrow criminal
statutes through their interpretation of mens rea requirements. In statutes that
omit a mens rea element, judges often supply it. 409 Judges can increase the
prosecution’s burden of proof by interpreting statutory mens rea
requirements to apply not just to the actus reus but also to the attendant

406

Id.
See generally Offit, supra note 14.
408
Klein & Grobey, supra note 236, at 73 (“Where Congress has refused to limit broadly
worded federal criminal prohibitions, either by clearer definitions or by enhancing culpability
requirements, the Supreme Court has once again stepped in to remedy the problem.”); id. at
73–77 (collecting decisions throughout federal criminal law).
409
See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (requiring the government to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant knew the weapon he possessed could fire more
than one shot automatically); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (requiring
criminal intent for conversion of government property, even when the statute made no mention
of intent).
407

468

LEIDER

[Vol. 111

circumstances. 410 And judges can narrow statutes by strengthening the
meaning of mens rea requirements. 411
Judges also can narrow the actus reus using a variety of statutory
interpretive tools. For example, based on federalism concerns and
constitutional avoidance principles, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope
of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 when
prosecutors used the provision to charge a woman for spreading toxic
chemicals to injure her husband’s paramour. 412 Later, using various
interpretive canons (e.g., noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis), the Court
narrowed the definition of “tangible object” in a Sarbanes-Oxley evidence
destruction provision when a U.S. Attorney prosecuted a fisherman for
throwing illegal fish overboard. 413 And concerned about the scope of honest
services fraud and the Hobbs Act’s official bribery provisions, the Supreme
Court whittled both crimes down to their most basic forms of wrongdoing. 414
In a few jurisdictions, legislatures have even delegated to judges some
power over prosecutorial discretion. Fifteen states have adopted statutes
permitting courts to dismiss prosecutions in the interests of justice. 415 Hawaii,
Maine, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have adopted section 2.12 of the
Model Penal Code, which authorizes judges to dismiss prosecutions for “de
minimis infractions.” 416 De minimis infractions include criminal conduct that
is (1) “within a customary license or tolerance,” (2) “did not actually cause
or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented . . . [or caused the harm]
410
See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (requiring the
government to prove that the defendant knew that the means of identification he unlawfully
transferred, possessed, or used did, in fact, belong to another person); Rehaif v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (requiring the prosecution to prove that a felon in possession of a
firearm knew that he had the relevant status when he possessed the firearm).
411
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203–05 (1991) (holding the
government must prove willfulness and intent to violate the law in tax evasion cases); Ratzlaf
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (requiring same elevated mens rea as applied to a
prosecution for structuring).
412
Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
413
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543–45 (2015) (relying on noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis, both of which use surrounding terms in a list to limit the scope of a general
or broad term in that list).
414
See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (reading the definition of
“official act” for purposes of the federal bribery statute narrowly); Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358 (2010) (reading the honest services statute to cover only bribery and kickback
schemes).
415
Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2017).
416
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-236 (2020); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 12 (2020);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11 (West 2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 312 (2020); see generally
Douglas Husak, The De Minimis “Defense” to Criminal Liability, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 362, 367 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2010).
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only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction,” or
(3) “presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded
as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense.” 417 These are factors
that prosecutors should consider when deciding whether to bring charges. So,
in these jurisdictions, courts have some residual power to check a
prosecutor’s decision to bring charges in trivial cases.
Judges have various soft-power tools, as well. Trial judges can express
their disapproval of certain prosecutions and encourage prosecutors to drop
charges or plead them out as lesser offenses. 418 Like prosecutors, judges face
docket pressures and prosecuting trivial cases is a poor use of judicial
resources. 419 Although judges may not be able to stop a determined
prosecutor from bringing charges, line prosecutors are repeat players who are
incentivized not to anger the judges that they will appear before.
Appellate judges have soft-power tools, too. They can express their
disapproval of the statute or the prosecution in the hopes that policymakers
take note. 420 They can also issue threats to narrow the scope of statutes by
how they interpret the mens rea or actus reus requirements. 421 These tools do
not correct all bad prosecutions, but they do send a message about the
judiciary’s tolerance for abusive prosecutions.
Sometimes, soft-power persuasion is not sufficient to restrain
prosecutorial excess, but statutory interpretation tools are too strong.
Between these two options lies a third way that judges control prosecutorial
excess: using minor technical reasons to reverse convictions that, for less
sympathetic defendants, would not merit reversal. The Seventh Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Abair is a good example. 422 The case involved a
prosecution for structuring. Abair, a Russian immigrant, had purchased a
home. Her Russian bank refused to transfer Abair’s money to her American
bank account because her Russian account was in her maiden name, while
her American account was in her married name. 423 So, Abair decided to
417

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (AM. L. INST., 1962).
See, e.g., Ohio County Judge Criticizes Prosecution Grand Jury Tactics, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (July 6, 2015), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/legal_affairs/ohio-cou
nty-judge-criticizes-prosecution-grand-jury-tactics/article_b81271ae-c933-5523-8a5bf2874f59bed0.html [https://perma.cc/WPU8-MM5C].
419
See Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 270 & n.223.
420
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 570 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
421
For example, during the oral argument in Yates, the Department of Justice stated that
its policy was to charge the most serious offense; Justice Scalia then warned the government
that he would be “very careful about how severe I make statutes.” Transcript of Oral Argument
at 29, Yates, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (No. 13-7451).
422
United States v. Abair, 746 F.3d 260, 261 (7th Cir. 2014).
423
Id.
418
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withdraw the money in small amounts from ATMs, which she deposited into
her American account. Because she transferred more than $10,000 in small
increments, the government prosecuted her for structuring. 424 The Seventh
Circuit reversed her conviction, holding that the government asked an
improper impeachment question when cross-examining Abair. 425 The
rationale for reversing the conviction was weak, 426 but it had the desired
effect: the U.S. Attorney’s Office did not retry the case. 427
Judges have some tools to combat prosecutorial leniency, though not as
many. Judges can refuse to accept plea bargains or, where plea bargained
sentences are nonbinding, subject defendants to higher sentences. 428
Philadelphia judges, for example, have already started pushing back on the
new district attorney’s leniency by rejecting pleas of juvenile offenders
originally sentenced to life in prison. 429 Most states also require a judge’s
approval to dismiss a prosecution after a prosecutor decides to file charges.430
And at the extreme outer perimeter of judicial power, where prosecutors
refuse to charge defendants, judges in some jurisdictions can appoint special
prosecutors to try the case—although this raises obvious separation of
powers concerns. 431
E. FEDERALISM

In criminal law, federalism is intertwined with overcriminalization. 432
Congress has expanded federal criminal law to cover traditional state
424

Id. at 262.
Id. at 265–66.
426
Id. at 269–70 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
427
United States v. Abair, No. 3:12-CR-00076 (N.D. Ind. May 9, 2014) (dkt. 112)
(dismissing indictment).
428
Darryl Brown, The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46
HOFSTRA L. REV. 63, 81 (2017) [hereinafter Brown, Judicial Role]; Daniel S. McConkie,
Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 66–67 (2015). For an
example of a judge with a policy against plea bargaining, see United States v. Walker, 922
F.3d 239, 251 (4th Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds.
429
Samantha Melamed, Philly Judges Block DA Krasner’s Deals for Juvenile Lifers
PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/krasner-juvenilelifer-judge-rejecting-deals-20180406.html [https://perma.cc/KM77-MXYV].
430
Misner, supra note 5, at 749.
431
See Brown, Judicial Role, supra note 428, at 73–76; see also, Marlena Baldacci, Elliot
C. McLaughlin, & Jen Goelz, Judge Stands by Decision to Appoint Special Prosecutor in
Jussie Smollett Case, CNN (July 31, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/31/us/ju
ssie-smollett-judge-prosecutor-motions-denied/index.html [https://perma.cc/8PSQ-KRYU].
432
See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995) (describing the consequences of having
substantive federal criminal law heavily duplicate state law).
425
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crimes. 433 Today, defendants are subject to two nearly coextensive criminal
law codes. 434 Federal prosecutors lack the resources to punish all state crime.
So, U.S. Attorneys effectively set federal criminal law by selecting which
offenses to prosecute. 435 And federal prosecutors can divert defendants into
the federal system where they generally face harsher penalties.
Less appreciated, however, is that duplicative criminalization serves as
a check against idiosyncratic prosecutorial preferences. Duplicative criminal
codes check prosecutorial leniency. Take the case in Philadelphia, for
example, where the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office offered a threeto-ten-year plea deal for the armed robber who shot a store owner with an
AK-47. In response, the U.S. Attorney indicted the defendant for Hobbs Act
robbery and for using a firearm during a crime of violence. 436 That defendant
now faces a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. 437 Similarly, before
the state trial court appointed a special prosecutor, a federal investigation was
underway in Chicago after state prosecutors dropped charges against Jussie
Smollett for allegedly faking a hate crime against himself.438 In economic
terms, the failure by one prosecutor to serve the market invites entry by other
market participants.
Relatedly, duplicative criminalization checks the ability of prosecutors
to show leniency that may accord with local democratic majorities. 439 During
the 1960s, when southern officials would not indict for racially-motivated
violence, the Department of Justice did, using federal civil rights charges. 440
The Boston Marathon bomber received a federal death sentence, even though
Massachusetts abolished the death penalty in 1984 and has repeatedly voted

433

Id. at 1141–45.
Id. at 1162 (“Many federal criminal statutes overlap with or merely duplicate state law
prohibitions unrelated to any substantial federal interest.”).
435
See supra note 92.
436
Julie Shaw, Federal Prosecutors Charge AK-47 Shooter Who Got Plea Deal from DA
Krasner’s Office, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/philade
lphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-us-attorney-william-mcswain-feds-charge-ak-gunman20190228.html#:~:text=McSwain%20and%20Philadelphia%20District%20Attorney,conside
red%20a%20lenient%20plea%20deal [https://perma.cc/6NCD-UJKF].
437
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924I(1)(A)(iii).
438
Terry Shropshire, Not So Fast: Jussie Smollett Still Under Investigation by the FBI,
USPS, ROLLING OUT (Mar. 27, 2019), https://rollingout.com/2019/03/27/not-so-fast-jussiesmollett-still-under-investigation-by-the-fbi-usps/ [https://perma.cc/TF49-9CUY].
439
Here, I disagree with Brown, who treats criminal law as essentially a local democratic
exercise. See Brown, Democracy, supra note 27, at 259.
440
Michal R. Belknap, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System
and the Anti-Civil-Rights Violence of the 1960’s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93, 104–05 (1984).
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against reinstating it. 441 And the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act permits federal prosecutions for hate crimes but only
after the Attorney General certifies that a state prosecution would be
ineffective to do justice. 442 Duplicative federal–state criminalization means
that enforcement of criminal law is not solely “local representation applying
local standards to the enforcement of essentially local laws.”443 And, to
restate an earlier point, it is one reason why I take no firm position on whether
the conventional law of crime is local or national; it is likely some of both.
Excessive harshness or leniency also can provoke state and local
governments to engage in “uncooperative federalism.” 444 Federal and state
prosecutors are interdependent. State governments have far more police,
investigators, and prosecutors than the federal government. 445 The federal
government often uses these resources. 446 But states also depend on the
federal government. The federal government has sophisticated investigative
resources that are often unavailable to state or local officials, such as witness
protection, forensic laboratories, and nationwide fingerprint analysis. 447 The
federal government also controls law enforcement grants.448 Prosecutors who
defy norms can create tension in this necessary relationship. When the Trump
441
MASS. GEN. LAWS 265 § 2 (2020); An Act Relative to Juvenile Sentences for First
Degree Murder, ch. 189, H.B. 4307, 2014. Legis. Serv. (Mass. 2014); Commonwealth v.
Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 1990) (striking down death penalty statute);
Massachusetts Again Votes Overwhelmingly Against Reinstating Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Nov. 16, 2007), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2216
[https://perma.cc/22GN-Y6UQ] (tracking votes against reinstating the death penalty). See
generally Brickey, supra note 432, at 1166–67 (“In enacting death penalty provisions for
dozens of crimes, for example, Congress chose to override the decisions of fourteen states and
the District of Columbia to ban capital punishment.”) (footnotes omitted).
442
18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1) (allowing certification when a state (1) lacks jurisdiction, (2)
has requested a federal prosecution, or (3) has prosecuted the case but “the verdict or sentence
obtained pursuant to State charges left demonstratively unvindicated the Federal interest in
eradicating bias-motivated violence,” and (4) when “a prosecution by the United States is in
the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice”).
443
JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 38 (1980).
444
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256 (2009).
445
Id. at 1280 (noting that “there are roughly ten times as many state and local full-time
police officers as federal officers”); Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 27, at 82
(noting the “[f]ederal enforcement bureaucracy is still quite small, at least when compared
with State and local authorities”).
446
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 444, at 1266–68.
447
Richman, Changing Boundaries, supra note 27, at 95; Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and
Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1009–10 & n.115 (1995).
448
See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 870, 882–84 (2015).
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Administration announced that it would take a harder line on immigration
enforcement, many municipalities declared themselves “sanctuary cities”
and refused to assist the federal government in detecting and detaining
unlawful aliens. 449 The Trump Administration, in turn, threatened to cut off
federal funds to those cities. 450 Ultimately, when breakdowns occur, both
sides suffer.
Given cooperative federalism, duplicative federal crimes should not be
written off as merely symbolic actions; they also provide concurrent
investigative jurisdiction for federal law enforcement agencies. Congress
evades constitutional limits on its Commerce Clause power 451 through
minimal jurisdictional nexuses, such as a requirement that a gun cross state
lines one time. 452 As a result, many contemporary federal crimes (e.g.,
involving child exploitation, carjacking, or domestic violence) essentially
duplicate state crimes. Even if the federal government does not intend to
enforce these overlapping federal crimes, those offenses provide federal law
enforcement agencies with jurisdiction to investigate, which they may use to
aid state prosecutors. 453 And more broadly, Congress’s failure to criminalize
an offense can leave federal investigative jurisdiction in doubt. For example,
when President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, murdering the president
was not a federal offense. No doubt, the murder violated state law, and Lee
Harvey Oswald would have been subject to the death penalty in Texas. The
federal assassination statute, thus, was largely duplicative of state law. 454 But
the Warren Commission nevertheless pushed for a federal murder statute
449

Martin Kaste, Trump Threatens ‘Sanctuary’ Cities with Loss of Federal Funds, NPR
(Jan. 26, 2017, 11:06 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/26/51189989
6/trumps-threatens-sanctuary-cities-with-loss-of-federal-funds [https://perma.cc/C5VH-KV
WH].
450
Id.; see also State v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding “the federal
government may deny grants of money to State and local governments that would be eligible
for such awards but for their refusal to comply with three immigration-related conditions
imposed by the Attorney General of the United States”).
451
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones
Act as a police regulation with insufficient connection to interstate commerce); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down part of the Violence Against Women Act on
similar grounds).
452
Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163, 1165–66 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
453
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-60.1010 (2020) (noting that federal law
enforcement may provide assistance to state and local officials to investigate carjacking);
Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 28, at 783 (explaining that the threat of more
severe federal penalties can aid in extracting pleas from those guilty of state crimes).
454
But not perfectly coextensive with every individual state law: federal law authorizes
the death penalty, which a minority of states have abolished.
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because the FBI and the Secret Service did not have clearly established
jurisdiction to investigate President Kennedy’s murder. 455
In theory, over-federalization can result in excessive harshness through
duplicative federal–state prosecutions. In practice, this rarely happens. For
decades, the Justice Department has maintained the “Petite Policy,” which
precludes federal prosecutors from bringing a second prosecution for
criminal conduct previously prosecuted in state court, subject to narrow
exceptions where the state prosecution failed to vindicate “a compelling
federal interest.” 456 The fact that the policy has existed so long through
different administrations with a variety of criminal justice policies provides
some evidence that it is not merely an instantiation of the Attorney General’s
private discretion. And a new Attorney General inclined to reverse the policy
would face significant hurdles. Federal prosecutors lack the resources
necessary to prosecute most state crimes. 457 Federal judges, upset with
burgeoning dockets, could issue sentences concurrent with state judgments,
making the subsequent prosecution pointless. And duplicative prosecutions
would discourage defendants in state cases from pleading guilty, placing
pressure on state criminal justice systems. 458
Although federal prosecutors may have more discretion than their state
counterparts, the scope of this discretion is often exaggerated. Much of a U.S.
Attorney’s docket is still consumed with cases for which there is heavy
political pressure to bring charges, albeit of a different sort than a state
prosecutor’s mandatory docket. 459 The vast majority of federal
prosecutions—about four in five—are for immigration violations, drug
trafficking, illegal gun possession, and fraud. 460 About half of federal charges
were brought under two federal laws for drug trafficking and illegal
reentry. 461
Given our federal structure, we should be wary of claims that
nonenforcement by one government somehow dilutes the moral message of
the criminal law. Stuntz worried that Congress reduced the expressive
function of punishment by legislating crimes that the executive would not
455

Morris D. Forkosch, Presidential Murder—The Constitutionality of a Statute Making
It a Federal Crime, 19 SW. L.J. 229, 229, 233–35 (1965).
456
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-2.031 (2020); see also Petite v. United States, 361
U.S. 529, 530–31 (1960).
457
Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 28, at 765–66.
458
See Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1181,
1198 (1996).
459
Klein & Grobey, supra note 236, at 7.
460
Id. at 6.
461
Id. at 20.
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enforce. 462 But nonenforcement by one level of government does not confer
the same societal approval of actions that nonenforcement by all levels of
government would have. Take Stuntz’s example of the Violence Against
Women Act, 463 which was part of the 1994 Crime Bill. 464 Congress not only
added a federal domestic violence crime, but also authorized other forms of
federal assistance to protect against domestic violence. Congress allocated
$1.6 billion in funds, provided for interstate recognition of protection orders,
and, in another section of the 1994 Crime Bill, prohibited the possession of
firearms by those subject to domestic violence restraining orders. 465 These
actions hardly correspond with a failure to take domestic violence seriously.
Serious enforcement by one level of government is sufficient to send a moral
message that society condemns an action.
Despite vast statutory overcriminalization, various checks and balances
control the criminal law through both formal and informal means. These
controls, in turn, generate norms that prosecutors follow. Conventional
norms narrow the reach of statutes, force other statutes to become
desuetudinal, and divide the scope of federal and state criminal law. These
norms check prosecutorial power when the majority tries to enact law over a
passionate minority or when local majorities try to substantially alter criminal
law norms widely held outside that community. Thus, viewing our
substantive criminal law as primarily statutory ignores the complicated ways
in which checks and balances mediate the substantive law around custom and
tradition. Our substantive criminal law is neither primarily statutory nor
delegated to prosecutors. In the next Part, I examine how our formal legal
doctrine should accommodate a primarily conventional criminal law system.
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DE FACTO CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL
SYSTEM
That our modern criminal law is primarily a system of unwritten and
informal conventions poses significant doctrinal challenges. In a
conventional system, obligatory customs are not judicially enforceable. The
enforcement of conventions, instead, relies on indirect means, such as
political pressure. Yet, prosecutions take place in courts, so when prosecutors
undertake actions that do not accord with community values, defendants
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Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 520–23.
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An Act to Control and Prevent Crime, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994).
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naturally seek judicial relief. 466 The result is a formal legal doctrine detached
from real-world criminal law practice, and it raises the question whether and
how legal doctrine should bridge the gap.
A. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE GAP BETWEEN DOCTRINAL AND DE
FACTO CRIMINAL LAW

The existence of a gap between statutory criminal law and the de facto
law is not, by itself, serious cause for concern. An unwritten common law
system can still respect traditional rule of law values of notice, clarity, and
prospectivity by tracking widely understood societal norms and customs.
Similarly, the existence of a de facto common law does not threaten rule-oflaw values if law enforcers respect criminal law conventions in their
decisions to enforce or not enforce statutory criminal law. In British
constitutional law, for example, respect for convention prevents the formal
requirement of royal assent for legislation from imperiling democratic norms.
Our system of criminal law conventions, however, falls short of this
ideal for at least three reasons. First, prosecutors actually defect from legal
conventions in some criminal cases. This makes criminal law conventions
significantly different from those in British constitutional law, in which a
defection would be highly visible and would trigger a constitutional crisis.
Second, in some areas of criminal law—particularly in sentencing—norms
have developed that are not public and not subject to the democratic checks
that ensure their evenhanded application across defendants. These norms fall
short of true legal conventions. Third, because formal law and conventions
diverge, prosecutors can leverage broader statutory criminal law to
circumvent traditional criminal procedure rights.
1. Substantive Criminal Law
The mismatch between formal legal rules and de facto conventional law
creates the potential for arbitrary and excessive criminal liability. In a
conventional criminal law system, no formal legal doctrine requires a
prosecutor to abide by the commonly understood conventions. And
sometimes prosecutors defect.
For example, Rudy Giuliani instituted “federal day” for drug crimes
when he was U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. 467
Ordinarily, conventional rules determine which crimes are prosecuted in state

466

See Myers, supra note 9, at 1349 (“A significant disconnect between the law and
current values leads to pressure on the system that seeks relief in the judiciary.”).
467
Brickey, supra note 432, at 1174 n.138.
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court and which are handled in federal court. 468 But on federal day, federal
prosecutors diverted all local drug cases to federal court, which imposes
harsher penalties for drug crimes. 469 To maximize deterrence, the U.S.
Attorney’s office kept secret which day was federal day. 470
Defections from commonly understood norms create serious rule-oflaw problems. Some are obvious, such as the distributive justice principle
that like cases should be treated alike. Giving a drug defendant a harsher
sentence because he was caught on Monday rather than Tuesday is the apex
of arbitrariness.
But the rule-of-law problems with prosecutorial defections run deeper
than just a failure of distributive justice. Defections can call into question the
public’s shared understanding about what the law really is. People base their
understandings of the legal system from their beliefs about shared practice,
not from the words in a statute book. 471 Unusual prosecutions unsettle the
community’s shared understanding of the law, and, correlatively, they
interfere with the basic requirements of clarity and prospectivity that underlie
the rule of law. 472
Overbroad criminal laws also allow prosecutors to target individuals
selectively. Virtually everyone commits a technical violation of some law. 473
The checks described in Part III mitigate much of that overcriminalization.
But checks that work well in the aggregate do not necessarily work well in
every individual case. So-called “contempt of cop” cases are one example.
When police and prosecutors take offense, they often respond in
disproportionate ways. 474 Another example may be the trend among some
federal prosecutors to find high-publicity cases to prosecute, which
prosecutors may leverage for their future careers. 475 A third example was the
independent counsel statute, which incentivized the targeting of high-level

468

See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The
Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
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political officials. 476 Criminal law conventions do not protect against isolated
cases of selective targeting. And that is especially true for individuals who
may be unsympathetic defendants or who are members of marginalized
populations for whom political recourse may not be a viable option to check
executive excess.
2. Plea Bargaining and Sentencing
Much of the worst overcriminalization problems involve excessive
harshness against guilty defendants. 477 A defendant’s sentence heavily
depends on the charges selected by the prosecution and on the process of plea
bargaining. 478 This introduces a lot of arbitrariness into the process. For
example, some jurisdictions may routinely prosecute three-strikes statutes,
while others do not. 479 Different jurisdictions—or even different prosecutors
within a jurisdiction—can seek widely divergent sentences for the same
criminal conduct. 480 And state and federal prosecutors may jointly use the
threat of severe (and redundant) federal penalties to compel guilty pleas. 481
A significant subset of these problems concerns sentences for pleabargained convictions. Although vast statutory sentencing ranges may leave
questionable the precise sanction a defendant will face for violating a law,
that uncertainty is reduced by the tendency of prosecutors and judges to have
“going rates” for plea bargains within a jurisdiction. 482 But the existence of
“going rates” can have significant legitimacy problems. These rates are often
not public, which means that lawyers who are repeat players have a
significant information advantage.483 They also lack any real claim to
476
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legitimacy. As a regular course of practice, these going rates may be
“conventions” in the broadest sense of that term. But going rates are not true
legal conventions, insofar as they are not generally accepted as binding on
legal actors, nor are they enforceable through nonlegal sanctions. Thus, going
rates lack political legitimacy insofar as the public is unaware of them and
has not acquiesced. And the inability to have binding conventions creates
distributive justice problems because, without significant means to enforce
the going rates, defendants’ sentences vary arbitrarily.
3. Criminal Procedure
The most serious harms of the gap between de facto and doctrinal law
occur not in substantive criminal law, but in criminal procedure. As Stuntz
observed, the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm in policing criminal procedure
has had the perverse effect of causing legislatures to water down substantive
criminal law requirements. 484 Traffic offenses are a paradigmatic example.
Although the Supreme Court has held that police need some justification to
detain a driver, 485 the Court has held that police may satisfy that burden if
they have probable cause to believe that the driver has committed any traffic
offense. 486 This gives police significant discretion to detain drivers for
conduct that is customarily tolerated (and for which the police probably will
not issue a violation anyway)—authority that police use to fish for more
serious wrongdoing. 487 In one case, for example, police pre-planned to detain
a suspected drug dealer once he exceeded the speed limit by a single mile per
hour. 488
Overbroad criminal law has two effects on criminal procedure and one
effect on civil redress. First, it narrows the effective scope of the exclusionary
rule. Police may justify detentions, and even arrests, by showing objective
probable cause that the defendant fits within some offense, however broadly
defined or however minor. 489 “Subjective intentions,” the Court held, “play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” 490 Second,
broader statutes reduce the prosecution’s burden of proof if a case goes to
trial. To borrow Richman and Stuntz’s example, it is easier to show that Al
484
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Capone did not pay his taxes than it is to prove his involvement in organized
criminal activity. 491 Third, with respect to civil law, overbroad criminal laws
disable civil remedies for police misconduct. If an officer has probable cause
that a person has committed an offense, he will have a defense to a tort action
arising either under state law for false imprisonment or malicious
prosecution, or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And in § 1983 actions, courts look again to “objective good
faith,” not to the officer’s subjective motivations. 492
Overbroad criminal law—especially as it relates to traffic offenses—
heavily drives racially-disparate policing. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has
reported that “[b]eing a driver in a traffic stop [is] the most common form of
police-initiated contact.” 493 African-American drivers are more likely to be
stopped by police than other racial groups. 494 Even outside of vehicles, police
stop African Americans at higher rates. 495 And these stops are significant
because they allow police to fish for more serious wrongdoing—indeed, the
stops themselves may be just a pretext to fish. 496 Prosecutors exercise
significant discretion at the investigative stage, when police choose whom to
investigate and how. 497 Prosecutors, however, cannot prosecute offenses that
they do not know about. 498 Broad statutes, thus, increase exposure to the
criminal justice system, even when police and prosecutors do not intend to
enforce them standing alone.
More broadly, there are serious procedural problems with how we
handle misdemeanor and petty-offense prosecutions. Our misdemeanor
system is (to borrow Brown’s phrase) “different and worse” 499 from how we
handle serious offenses. Defendants often lack the right to counsel and the
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right to trial by jury. 500 Although defendants have these rights for serious
misdemeanors, 501 they may be ineffective. Many defendants cannot afford
bail, and for them, pleading guilty may be their only means to escape long
pretrial detention. 502 And prosecutors often lobby legislatures against
adequately funding public defenders. 503 Without the pressures created by a
system of checks, prosecutors often screen charges cursorily, if at all. 504 In
jurisdictions that keep track of prosecution decisions, it appears that
prosecutors decline felony cases at substantially higher rates than
misdemeanor cases. 505
This leads to problematic results. Although misdemeanor convictions
may lack the collateral consequences of felony convictions, they can still
have long-lasting effects. Defendants face subsequent burdens caused by
paying off fines, violating probation, and having suspended driver’s
licenses. 506 And more misdemeanor arrests also lead to more felony arrests.
As with traffic offenses, police use misdemeanor arrests as a pretext to search
for more serious wrongdoing. 507 So, uneven enforcement of misdemeanor
crimes facilitates uneven enforcement of felonies.
B. CLOSING THESE GAPS

How can criminal law address the problems identified in the previous
Section? In this Section, I argue that criminal law reform efforts should look
toward conventional law and provide ways to indirectly enforce community
norms. This Section has two subsections.
Subsection One will look theoretically at different approaches that
courts can take with respect to incorporating legal conventions. These
approaches are to ignore the conventions entirely, to incorporate them as
binding law, or to incorporate them indirectly. I argue that courts should
adopt the third approach.
500
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that counsel is required only if the
sentence imposed is one of imprisonment); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002)
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Subsection Two then applies that approach to several of the remaining
problems identified in Section A. Instead of statutory reform, the imposition
of democratically-accountable checks on criminal justice actors may
ameliorate many of these deficiencies in criminal law. Most of the individual
policy proposals are not novel. My hope, instead, is to give them a coherent
theoretical grounding and to reframe their justification. These proposals
promote criminal law conventions through the creation and indirect
enforcement of criminal law norms. Viewed in this way, these proposals—
especially reinvigorating the power of juries—should not be viewed as
inviting lawless equitable exceptions to criminal law; to the contrary, they
promote the rule of law by tailoring broad statutes to the community’s shared,
present understanding of proper criminalization and punishment.
1. Formal Legal Rules and Conventional Criminal Law
In Conventions in Court, Vermeule explains three approaches that
courts can take vis-à-vis legal conventions. First, courts can ignore the
existence of conventions. Second, they can directly enforce them by treating
them as an explicit part of the law. Third, they can recognize the existence of
the conventions but enforce them indirectly. 508 Here, I will argue for a
version of Vermeule’s third option: legal actors—not just courts—should
facilitate the indirect enforcement of criminal law conventions. Some
separation between de facto and statutory criminal law is inherent in our
system because legislatures must draft and amend statutes under nonideal
conditions, including limited legislative time, counter-majoritarian vetogates
in the legislative process, and lack of political consensus among those
responsible for drafting the criminal law. Courts and legislatures should
embrace criminal law conventions as a way to provide legitimacy and
democratic responsiveness to criminal law under these nonideal conditions.
a. The Classical Approach
The first possibility that Vermeule identifies is what he labels “the
classical approach” or “[t]he classical Diceyan view.” Under that view,
courts enforce only formal sources of law, such as statutes and common law.
Conventions are not “law,” which means that remedies for the violations of
conventions belong solely to the political process. 509

508
509

at cxli.

For reasons explained below, I will treat indirect enforcement in the third category.
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In criminal law, the Diceyan approach may be best represented by
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Yates v. United States. 510 Yates involved a
fisherman caught with undersized grouper in federal waters.511 At that time,
federal law required groupers to be more than twenty inches long, but Yates
was caught with seventy-two fish between 18.75- and 20-inches long. The
officer issued a citation for the fish, placed the undersized fish in separate
crates, and ordered Yates to transport them back to shore. 512 By the time
Yates returned to shore, he had dumped the undersized fish back into the
ocean. 513 The Government charged Yates with violating the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 by destroying a “tangible object” that impeded a government
investigation. 514
The Government’s prosecution under Sarbanes-Oxley was excessive.
The fishing violation was a noncriminal violation; Yates faced either a civil
fine or an administrative suspension of his fishing license. 515 But Yates faced
up to twenty years in prison for the Sarbanes-Oxley charge, an offense
created after the Enron scandal to combat those covering up accounting
fraud. 516
Justice Kagan’s dissent recognized the real issues in the case:
“overcriminalization and excessive punishment in the U.S. Code.” 517 This
Sarbanes-Oxley provision was “a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated,
with too-high maximum penalties, which gives prosecutors too much
leverage and sentencers too much discretion.” She also recognized that this
statute was “not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal
criminal code.” 518
But for Justice Kagan, none of this context had any legal significance.
For her, the fish was a tangible object, so Yates’s offense fell within the plain
text of the statute. 519 As a judge, that was all she was authorized to decide. 520
Congress, not judges, bore sole responsibility for fixing
overcriminalization. 521 Justice Kagan’s opinion was a dissent, of course. But
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521

574 U.S. 528 (2015).
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there are plenty of majority opinions in which courts have thrown up their
hands in the face of overcriminalization, declaring it to be a legislative
problem. 522 That the Sarbanes-Oxley provision was overbroad was a political
problem, which the judiciary was not competent to resolve as an interpreter
of law.
In the realm of criminal law, the Diceyan approach has little to
commend. Presumably, its chief benefit is that it promotes democratic
legitimacy of criminal law by vesting the power to shape criminal law in a
legislature accountable to the voters. But that is not, of course, the reality. As
Stuntz recognized, legislatures pass broad and vague criminal laws, which
can shift the de facto criminal lawmaking to prosecutors.523 Preventing
criminal law from becoming the law of prosecutors requires adequate checks
on prosecutorial power. A court’s failure to facilitate checks and balances is
itself an important structural decision to facilitate executive primacy.
b. Direct Enforcement
The second approach, direct incorporation, brings conventions within
the formal legal system. Under this approach, conventions are
“straightforwardly judicially enforceable in whatever ways, and to the extent
that, other sources of law are judicially enforceable.” 524 Judicial enforcement
may occur in two ways. Judges may enforce conventions directly by holding
that the conventions “generat[e] a legal obligation without the presence of a
separate legal rule which is being interpreted or applied.” 525 Or judges may
indirectly enforce conventions by using them to construe statutes and other
formal sources of law when those formal sources are indeterminate. 526 My
argument here will focus on the direct enforcement approach.
As explained above, a few American jurisdictions include some legal
conventions as part of their formal criminal law. Four states allow judges to
dismiss de minimis offenses when, for example, a person’s conduct did not
create the harm sought to be prevented by the statute. 527 Ordinarily, this
would be solely an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. West Virginia courts
also may declare certain statutory crimes desuetudinal.
522
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In Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Printz,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized a desuetude defense
to criminal violations. 528 The case involved a noncriminal disciplinary
proceeding against an attorney alleging that the attorney unethically
demanded that his client’s alleged victim return nearly $400,000 in
embezzled funds; in exchange, the attorney promised that his client would
not file embezzlement charges with police. 529 A predicate issue was whether
the attorney had violated an archaic West Virginia statute that prohibited
compounding crimes. 530 The statute contained no defense for victims who
sought only restitution under a claim of right. 531
The court held that West Virginia’s statute was unconstitutional “to the
extent that it prohibits a victim or his agent from seeking restitution in lieu
of a criminal prosecution” because the offense was desuetudinal in those
circumstances. 532 Analogizing to void for vagueness doctrine, the court
explained that “a law prohibiting some act that has not given rise to a real
prosecution in 20 years is unfair to the one person selectively prosecuted
under it.” 533 Although ultimately grounding its holding in constitutional due
process, the court’s analytical framework for desuetude was based on Roman
customary law. 534 The court said that a malum prohibitum crime may become
desuetudinal where there are “open, notorious, and pervasive violation[s] of
the statute for a long period” and a “conspicuous policy of
nonenforcement” 535—which the court believed had happened to the crime of
compounding, at least where the victim seeks only restitution. Thus, unlike
the classical approach, the direct incorporation approach makes customs a
binding part of the legal system.
The argument for direct enforcement of legal conventions is stronger in
criminal law than it is in constitutional law. In the constitutional realm,
Vermeule objected that conventions could produce undemocratic and
normatively bad equilibria, which democratic majorities would be powerless
to overturn. 536 Criminal law conventions arguably avoid these pitfalls. Many
of the institutions that drive criminal law conventions—legislative oversight
of executive enforcement, electoral accountability of prosecutors, and the
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
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threat of jury trials, among others—provide democratic accountability. So,
criminal law norms may be less “democratically suspect” than their
constitutional counterparts. 537 And if bad conventions result, citizens can
overturn them through ordinary statutory means. 538 For example, if a local
district attorney unreasonably refuses to prosecute a certain class of offenses,
the state can vest the power in other prosecutors 539 or Congress can
intervene. 540 Overturning constitutional conventions, in contrast, may require
a constitutional amendment.
Despite these advantages, there are still good reasons for courts to avoid
direct enforcement of conventions. First, courts may legitimately worry that
direct enforcement threatens separation of powers. 541 Epps argues that formal
separation of powers is unnecessary and insufficient to protect individual
liberty in the face of the criminal justice system.542 I agree. But the formal
separation of powers is still part of our constitutional system. A judiciary that
arrogates for itself the power to override criminal law would be acting as a
super-legislature, thereby undermining the coherence of our system. The rule
of law requires that judges respect a particular legal system’s internal legal
rules.
Direct enforcement may also create instrumental problems by inhibiting
the evolution of criminal law. Conventions often change when someone
violates them and that violation gains acceptance.543 Breaches of convention
may be normatively important to fix bad conventions. For example, it may
have been the custom to ignore domestic violence as a “family issue.” 544 If
courts had directly incorporated the convention, that custom would have been
a legally recognized exception, thereby requiring the legislature to pass a new
statute to punish domestic violence. The same goes for white violence against
African Americans in the South. No matter how much a society informally
537
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tolerated it at one time, we would not have wanted such conventions to ossify
into formal law, changeable only through legislation. In the case of racial
violence, duplicative federal criminalization permitted the federal
government to destroy pernicious local conventions. 545 Once destroyed, local
jurisdictions then had the power, without further legislation, to apply the laws
against violence evenly.
Allowing conventional change also encourages criminal law
conventions to adapt to changing times. Take draft registration. A military
draft appears to be a remote possibility, and there has been little support to
see U.S. Attorneys prosecute hundreds of thousands of young men who do
not register. 546 But if there were a largescale armed conflict necessitating the
draft, we may want prosecutors to be able to enforce the draft registration
laws. 547 Judicial enforcement of contemporary conventions risks ossifying
conventions in suboptimal ways. 548
c. Judicial Recognition and Indirect Enforcement
The third option is that the judiciary may recognize conventions, even
while they do not directly enforce them. 549 The lack of direct enforcement
means that “conventions are not to be enforced by courts as freestanding
obligations.” 550 But courts may nevertheless recognize and consider criminal
law conventions in their decisions in two ways.
First, judges may indirectly enforce specific conventions. In indirect
enforcement, judges enforce a convention “because of its connection with a
distinct legal right.” 551 Conventions may provide necessary background and
context “to clarify the meaning of statutes.” 552 Or, outside of statutory
545
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not prosecuted anyone for failing to register for the Selective Service System since 1986.
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interpretation, judges may enforce criminal law conventions by using
procedural rules to deter prosecutions outside of commonly accepted
limits. 553
Second, judges may account for criminal law conventions by treating
the system itself as conventional. At this macro level, judges do not enforce
conventions related to particular crimes. But they do strive to maintain the
conventional system. Judges do this by facilitating checks and balances 554
and, more specifically, the kinds of checks that encourage the criminal law
to adapt to democratic preferences.
Take Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, which upheld the
independent counsel statute. 555 The first four parts of Justice Scalia’s dissent
concerned separation of powers. He argued that Congress may not shield
independent counsel against Presidential removal because the Constitution
vests purely executive power in the President alone. 556 But Part V of the
opinion switched from a discussion of separation of powers to one
concerning checks on prosecutorial abuse. Quoting Justice Jackson, Justice
Scalia explained that “[w]ith the law books filled with a great assortment of
crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical
violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, . . . it is a
question of picking the man and then searching the law books . . . .” 557
Because prosecutors have enormous formal legal power, Justice Scalia
continued, “the primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one,”
and thus it is necessary to have prosecutors who can be removed by an elected
official accountable to the people. 558
At the macro level, this is the quintessential way in which judges take
account of the conventional nature of criminal law. Unlike the dissent in
Yates (which Justice Scalia ironically joined), Justice Scalia’s answer in
Morrison was not for the executive branch to seek legislative reform cabining
the number of substantive crimes. That was water under the bridge. Instead,
Justice Scalia recognized the need for nonlegal checks against prosecutors to
cabin the de facto scope of substantive criminal law. 559 And one way in which
the judiciary could facilitate nonlegal checks is by prohibiting Congress from
553
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shielding individual prosecutors from removal by politically accountable
officers.
The political accountability of prosecutors is just one example.560 I will
offer some other examples in the next subsection, especially as they relate to
trial by jury. Both electoral accountability and trial by jury are important not
just because they provide checks in the abstract, but because they provide
democratic checks on substantive criminal law. The examples in the
following subsection also recognize that criminal law conventions are not
directly analogous to their constitutional law counterparts. Violations of
constitutional conventions are high-information events. People will notice
when an elector is faithless or, in Britain, if the Queen vetoes a bill. Criminal
law conventions are different. Most people will not notice if police ticket a
random person for going one mile per hour above the speed limit, if police
arrest someone for a hypertechnical criminal violation, or if a prosecutor
significantly overcharges a person for a minor violation. Structurally, we
need checks that deter low-information deviations and encourage prosecutors
to shape their charging decisions around societal norms.
2. Harnessing Conventions to Correct for Overcriminalization’s Problems
In this section, I will offer some policy proposals to correct
contemporary overcriminalization problems. These include, among others,
to give the jury more power over sentencing defendants, to reinvigorate the
executive clemency process, to provide more transparency in criminal law
enforcement, and to have courts consider an officer’s subjective good faith
when making detentions and arrests for offenses that are not customarily
enforced. The basic theme of these proposals is that legal actors should seek
to develop and preserve unwritten conventions as a necessary supplement to
statutory criminal law.
a. Prosecutorial Discretion over Guilty Defendants
Outside of overcriminalization’s effect on criminal procedure
(discussed below), perhaps the most serious overcriminalization problem is
that prosecutors have enormous power over those who are guilty of breaching
societal norms. 561 Comparatively few criminal cases today go to trial.
560
It is unclear whether Justice Scalia thought the political accountability of prosecutors
was sufficient for checking expansive criminal law. Justice Scalia also joined Justice Kagan’s
dissent in Yates, which suggested that overcriminalization was a problem for Congress, not
the courts. Or perhaps Justice Scalia saw the conventional nature of criminal law more acutely
when prosecutors went after executive branch officials than he did when prosecutors charged
private defendants.
561
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Prosecutors and defendants resolve the overwhelming majority through plea
bargains. 562 And when a defendant has committed a blameworthy act (not
just a technical statutory violation), redundant and overlapping criminal
provisions give prosecutors leverage. 563 Prosecutors can dictate sentencing
outcomes by deciding what crimes are charged and which facts go into the
plea—for example, whether the drugs were of a certain weight, a firearm was
carried, or a recidivist statute applies. Out of respect for separation of powers,
courts have refused to review prosecutorial charging decisions, absent the
most flagrant forms of abuse. 564 And individual sentencing recommendations
tend to be low-information events in which political pressure will not cabin
prosecutorial abuse. 565
One method to combat unreasonable charging decisions by prosecutors
would be to further empower juries. Judges, first, can inform jurors about a
defendant’s possible sentence exposure, including the maximum possible
sentence and any mandatory minimums. In Yates, for example, the judge
could have informed the jury that the defendant faced up to twenty years in
prison for throwing the fish overboard. 566 Appellate courts have routinely
held that district courts are not obligated to inform juries about the relative
sentencing ranges. 567 But, except for a recent Second Circuit decision, 568 they
have not held that courts inherently abuse their discretion by providing jurors
with this information. 569
Providing the jury with sentencing information is not inherently
tantamount to endorsing nullification. At trial, defendants may offer defenses
that are implausible but not frivolous. A jury that knows the full
consequences of its decision may have different perceptions about what
constitutes reasonable doubt or how to apply a vague element of the
offense. 570 Jurors would probably insist on more certainty before putting
someone to death than they would if the offense were as serious as a traffic
562
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violation. 571 Because the harshness of the sentence may influence how juries
perceives reasonable doubt, prosecutors may be more likely to drop harsh
mandatory minimums in cases where they may not be appropriate by either
charging a less-serious crime with a correspondingly less-serious sentence or
by not bringing charges at all.
Although giving the jury sentencing information is not inherently a
license to nullify, a little jury nullification may not be a bad thing. Jurors have
traditionally played this role, most famously when undervaluing stolen goods
to prevent thieves from receiving the death penalty. 572 Judges can facilitate a
similar kind of “pious perjury” 573 with harsh recidivist provisions. Recidivist
statutes amplify punishments, often by many multiples for drug and gun
offenders. 574 Yet, despite Apprendi, which expanded the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right to most sentencing enhancements, defendants charged under
recidivist statutes have no right to trial by jury on whether they were
previously convicted. 575 Just like eighteenth-century jurors would
undervalue property, juries might be unwilling to convict under recidivist
statutes if they are told they must find that a person was previously convicted.
Indeed, it appears that under the formerly-binding Sentencing Guidelines, 576
judges frequently did this on their own. 577
Detractors will object that empowering jurors in these ways encourages
lawless juries. But the lawlessness objection is based on a mistaken
perspective that statutory law is our criminal law, and that to acquit in the
face of technical guilt is to allow an acquittal against the law. In actuality, we
know that de facto criminal law is narrower than statutory criminal law, 578
and that sentencing enhancements (as with criminal statutes more broadly)
can be inappropriately applied to trivial instantiations of wrongdoing. 579
Allowing the jury to know a defendant’s sentencing exposure provides a
check whereby the community can judge whether the prosecutor has acted
lawlessly by overcharging particular cases. That is, juries can refuse to
571
572
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endorse the actions of prosecutors who act technically within statutes but
outside the commonly accepted criminal law conventions.
For cases that do not go to trial, prosecutors should have to disclose to
the public their “going rates” for plea bargains. Disclosure will confer several
advantages over the present system. First, it will ameliorate some of the
information advantage that repeat players have within a courthouse. 580
Second, publication of the information will deter prosecutors from deviating
in isolated cases. 581 Third, publication will also subject the going rates to
democratic legitimacy. Most prosecutors are elected, and the actual expected
sentences for crimes are a core criminal justice issue that should be the
subject of popular oversight through elections. Even though prosecutorial
elections are low-information events, the availability of this information
would alert the public to substantial deviations from popular norms and deter
prosecutors from setting popularly unacceptable going rates. 582 Here again,
the goal is to develop legal conventions that have popular legitimacy and the
real threat of indirect sanctions for violating them.
b. Developing Conventions to Cabin Statutory Mandatory Minimum
Sentences and to Reduce the Need for Congress to Pass Such
Sentencing Laws
A robust system of checks and balances can also ameliorate the
problems created by excessively harsh mandatory minimum sentences. In
addition to providing greater jury participation, the criminal law can cabin
excessively harsh sentences by reinvigorating the clemency process. Pardons
and commutations were among the traditional remedies for excessively harsh
statutory sentences. 583 Today, clemency is rare. Except for President
Obama’s grant of clemency to some drug offenders at the end of his second
term, most years see, at most, a few dozen people pardoned and a handful of
commutations. 584 The virtual unavailability of clemency can work significant
injustice in cases where prosecutors have overcharged crimes and in marginal
cases where Congress’s statutory penalties are too harsh given the facts.
580
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The causes of dysfunction in the clemency process are primarily
political: for most politicians, the risk is asymmetric. As the infamous Willie
Horton ad showed, politicians can face significant public backlash for
providing leniency, if someone later reoffends. 585 In contrast, the refusal to
give clemency has little political cost, and those most affected often cannot
vote. 586
In part, reform should look to provide executives with political cover.
Courts can play a more active role in suggesting clemency. In cases where
statutory sentences are too harsh, nothing prevents courts from sending
recommendations to the Pardon Attorney that the President should
immediately commute the sentence to something more reasonable. Such
procedures were routinely used by English judges. 587 A judge’s
recommendation to commute an unreasonable sentence may also give the
President or a Governor some political cover in case the defendant reoffends
in the future. Some have proposed creating a clemency commission. 588 The
existence of such a commission could also help the executive diffuse
responsibility when someone reoffends. In the federal system, Congress
should also create some separation between the clemency process and the
Department of Justice. The current organizational structure—in which
responsibility for mitigating harsh results is vested in the same department
that prosecuted the case—is inherently a conflict of interest. As such, the
Pardon Attorney’s office should be removed from the Department of Justice.
Legislatures and judges might also reduce the need for mandatory
minimums by dividing sentencing responsibility. Legislatures often pass
mandatory minimums to prevent idiosyncratic judges from issuing
inappropriately low sentences. 589 The problem is more acute where judges
lack accountability to the electorate. 590 Dividing sentencing responsibility
585
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may help prevent inappropriately low sentences issued by single trial judges,
thereby reducing the incentive to have mandatory minimum sentences. One
method may be to solicit the jury, as representatives of the community, to see
what they believe to be the appropriate sentence. 591 And juror participation
may prevent excessive harshness, too. In at least one judge’s experience,
“Every time I ever went back in the jury room and asked the jurors to write
down what they thought would be an appropriate sentence . . . every time—
even here, in one of the most conservative parts of Iowa, where we haven’t
had a ‘not guilty’ verdict in seven or eight years—they would recommend a
sentence way below the guidelines sentence.” 592 The use of a multimember
jury—as opposed to a single judge—can cabin the effects of idiosyncratic
preferences and mistaken perceptions.
c. Misdemeanor Practice
I do not purport to offer a full slate of reforms for misdemeanor justice.
Code reform may help a little; some misdemeanors (e.g., marijuana
possession) no longer involve conduct that society generally condemns. And
code reform can help correct other overcriminalization problems, such as the
power to use technical offenses to expand law enforcement’s search and
seizure authority. 593 Even when officers do not care about the underlying
misdemeanor, the existence of such offenses can serve as a gateway to fish
for more serious crimes. 594
But code reform alone cannot fix the misdemeanor system because the
core of prosecuted misdemeanors and petty offenses also involve conduct
that society does condemn—driving under the influence, theft, vandalism,
trespass, disorderly conduct, weapons violations, and the like. 595 Going
beyond code reform, the goal of misdemeanor reform should be to develop a
conventional law of misdemeanor crime that complements our statutory
system. This can be done by facilitating checks on police and prosecutors. In
part, this will involve removing barriers to presently existing checks. Setting
high cash bail and inadequately funding public defenders, for example, gives
591
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prosecutors inordinate leverage over indigent defendants. 596 Even in our
system of plea bargaining, prosecutors shape their charging decisions around
expected trial outcomes. 597 But the threat of going to trial will not discipline
prosecutors when they know that defendants will have to pay a heavy price
to exercise their rights.
d. Discouraging Arbitrary Enforcement
Criminal law conventions are different from constitutional conventions
because law enforcement officials may make occasional deviations from
criminal law conventions without incurring significant nonlegal obstacles.
For example, even if nearly all drivers can drive within five or ten miles per
hour of the speed limit with impunity, police ticket a few such drivers each
year. 598 In these cases, the law seems to be defined by statute, not by
convention. This reflects the fact that most criminal prosecutions are lowinformation events, 599 a fortiori, when the offense is a misdemeanor or an
infraction. Arbitrary enforcement of statutes creates significant rule-of-law
problems, particularly when that enforcement may be in violation of
customary norms.
Here, the legislature and the executive branch may take steps to promote
the rule of law. Because conventions depend on nonlegal means for their
enforcement, increasing transparency in law enforcement aids in applying
political sanctions when actors breach criminal law conventions. To continue
with the speeding ticket example, it would be helpful to know who and why
officers ticketed for minor speeding. One can think of many legitimate and
customary reasons for these tickets. Perhaps these individuals were, in fact,
going significantly faster, but the officer wrote the ticket as if the driver were
just above the limit to reduce the fine. Or perhaps they were driving at an
unsafe speed through a school zone. Alternatively, one can think of more
problematic reasons, such as pretextual stops (e.g., because the person was
suspected of a drug violation) or just being arbitrarily selected by police. The
fact that forty drivers in Virginia received a speeding ticket in 2018 for
driving less than five miles per hour above the speed limit may not be a
significant political event to change police practices. But if the data reveal
troubling trends about who are selected and why, that could provide the
596
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necessary political impetus for correction.600 Legislatures can also require
police and prosecutors to disclose their office policies for enforcing the law.
If a prosecutor’s office has a policy to decline marijuana possession cases,
that decision has a de facto legal effect in that jurisdiction. The publication
of such policies may make it more difficult to maintain isolated and arbitrary
prosecutions. In a conventional system, the principal cabining of power
comes through effective nonlegal checks on the arbitrary enforcement of
statutes. 601
e. Criminal Procedure and Pretext
Some of the worst effects of statutory overcriminalization concern its
effects on criminal procedure. 602 Acknowledging that unwritten conventions
form part of criminal law may help alleviate some of these problems. For
example, courts might require subjective good faith to justify a search or
seizure when the police only have probable cause that a person has
committed an offense that is ordinarily within the customary tolerance of
society, such as driving one mile per hour above the speed limit. 603 A similar
rule might also apply in civil cases, which would give civil juries more power
to remedy pretextual stops.
The Court’s recent decision in Nieves v. Bartlett heads in this
direction. 604 The case involved a § 1983 claim alleging that officers arrested
the plaintiff for disorderly conduct as retaliation for the plaintiff’s exercise
of his First Amendment rights.605 The Court held that, in general, a plaintiff
in a retaliatory prosecution case must “plead and prove the absence of
probable cause for the underlying criminal charge.” 606 But concerned that
police could justify an arrest by providing probable cause of any statutory
violation, including those such as jaywalking that rarely result in arrest, the
Court also held that “the no-probable-cause requirement should not apply
600
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when a plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when
otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of
protected speech had not been.” 607 This exception recognizes that we have a
common law of crime, which is narrower than the statutes on the books.
An effort to inject more subjective good faith into the Fourth
Amendment and civil actions come at significant cost for police. In Whren,
the Supreme Court said, “[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us
to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly
violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the
lawfulness of enforcement.” 608 But judges, no less than other members of the
community, have general knowledge about the norms of how laws are
enforced. And this approach facilitates symmetry between police and the
community. The community knows that statutory criminal law is overbroad;
to navigate this, individuals have to have some sense about what are the “real
crimes” and what technical crimes fall within customary tolerance. The
police should be held to the same standard in their enforcement decisions.
Thus, courts should examine charges with more scrutiny when law
enforcement officers stop or arrest someone for offenses that widely come
within customary social tolerances, such as trivial speeding.
These proposed solutions do not solve all externalities caused by
overcriminalization. Stuntz is correct that broader crimes dilute the burden
of proof at trial, 609 and I am not sure there is a great answer to that problem.
For certain statutory omissions (e.g., absence of a mens rea requirement),
courts can continue to apply the normal rules of statutory construction and
infer stricter statutory requirements. And as many commentators have called
for, courts also can use the ordinary tools of statutory construction—
especially clear statement rules and the rule of lenity—to curb the scope of
statutes. 610 More rigorous statutory review will deter prosecutors from
bringing cases that the statute was not designed to reach. And when judges
narrow the scope of ambiguous statutes, they shift the burden back to the
legislature to decide whether certain marginal cases should, in fact, be
criminalized.
607
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But more aggressive approaches to interpreting statutes will lead the
judiciary to exercise too much power to redraft statutes. That cure may be
worse than the disease. It may be that we have to rely on the other actors in
the criminal justice system to ensure that prosecutors do not abuse relaxed
burdens of proof. The development and recognition of criminal law
conventions will not fix every serious problem of statutory
overcriminalization.
CONCLUSION
Most accounts of contemporary American criminal law paint a
distressing picture. Criminal codes are broad, vague, and harsh. Political
dysfunction causes legislatures continually to add new crimes. Everyone
violates some law—whether petty or serious—virtually every day.
Ultimately, prosecutors are left to decide who to charge and for what, making
them “the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.” 611 And federal law
often duplicates state law but with much harsher penalties.612 The result, we
are told, is a system of criminal justice that fails to adhere to many basic
principles of legality. Broad and vague criminal laws fail to put people on
notice of what conduct is criminal. These laws lack democratic legitimacy
because broad and vague laws essentially delegate criminal lawmaking to
prosecutors. And having duplicative federal and state criminal codes
facilitates the disparate treatment of offenders who commit identical crimes.
This vision of criminal law is unduly bleak. A lawless world in which
prosecutors truly act as both lawmakers and law enforcers would look very
different from ours. In reality, our system is fairly predictable. That is
because a rich set of unwritten norms supplement our statutory system.
Criminal law remains a form of conventional law. It is not the legal realist
common law of judge-made rules, but rather an older vision of common law,
where the law is defined by present but evolving customs. Those customs
shape statutory law into a workable system of criminal law. They narrow
overbroad statutes. They divide federal and state criminal law, despite their
statutory overlap. And, perhaps most importantly, these customs shift as
society shifts, providing legitimacy to our criminal law as it presently exists.
These customs are the result of extensive checks and balances, which
do exist in our criminal law. Legislatures, voters, jurors, judges, and
redundant executive officials keep the criminal law in check. They place
pressure to enforce the law against those who engage in blameworthy
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conduct. And they apply pressure against enforcing statutory laws that have
no relationship to blameworthy conduct.
The development of common-law-like norms through checks on power
may also provide a method of improving those areas where our modern
criminal law has fallen short. Harsh sentencing in individual cases, arbitrary
enforcement of misdemeanors, and arbitrary use of substantive criminal law
to circumvent search and seizure rights have occurred in pockets where there
are few effective checks on executive power. And the rise of mandatory
minimum sentences occurred as a response to perceived abuses by individual
judges, who wield enormous discretion in sentencing. Empowering juries,
reinvigorating the clemency process, removing barriers that prevent
misdemeanor defendants from exercising trial rights, and requiring
subjective good faith on the part of law enforcement when they enforce laws
more severely than the community expects may all contribute to the
development of unwritten conventions that check the excesses technically
allowed by statutory law.
More basically, we should stop fretting over the state of statutory law.
The criminal codification project promised more than it could deliver: clear
laws, specifying specific conduct ex ante, written for all to read and learn,
and maintained by a democratically-accountable legislature that would be
responsive to popular shifts. But statutory laws are never perfectly drafted.
Small errors can create large overcriminalization problems, while precise
specification encourages bad actors to find legal loopholes. Making matters
worse, legislatures lack the time and resources to maintain criminal codes.
These legislative defects are not readily fixable. Fortunately, our criminal law
is not primarily statutory. Statutes may provide the broad framework for our
criminal law, but unwritten conventions—a kind of common law—place the
meat on the statutory bones. 613 In this system, we primarily improve our
criminal law not by fixing statutes, but by developing and improving our
customs and traditions.
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